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Essays on Asymmetric Information
Anh Hong Nguyen
This dissertation consists of three essays on the role of asymmetric information in eco-
nomics. The central theme is on how asymmetric information, which can arise either exoge-
nously or endogenously, have important implications on welfare and market design.
Chapter 1 is entitled Within-Household Selection in the Health Insurance Market. This
chapter studies the existence of adverse selection in Vietnam’s Social Health Insurance pro-
gram and how household decision making affects individual enrollment into insurance. I
find that while there is a strong evidence of adverse selection at the individual level, se-
lection into insurance happens both across and within households. I then explore different
household factors that affect the selection of health insurance within the household such as
the household’s ability to share risk and within-household bargaining power. These findings
have important policy implications for two reasons. First, in the presence of household de-
cision making, price discrimination policy to reduce adverse selection at the individual level
such as age-based pricing might not always be welfare improving. Second, any policy that
attempts to generate pooling beyond the level sustained by the private market can distort
the household’s incentive to buy health insurance and worsen adverse selection for the rest
of the market.
Chapter 2 is entitled Household Bundling to Reduce Adverse Selection: Application to
Social Health Insurance. This chapter explores the use of bundling to reduce adverse selec-
tion in insurance markets and its application to social health insurance programs. When
the choice to buy health insurance is made at the household level, bundling the insurance
policies of household members eliminates the effect of adverse selection within a household
since the household can no longer select only sick members to enroll. However, this can ex-
acerbate adverse selection across households, as healthier households might choose to drop
out of the insurance market. The net effect of this trade-off depends on the characteristics
of the household demand for medical care and risk preferences. I explore this issue using
individual survey data on insurance enrollment and medical spending in Vietnam that con-
tain detailed information about the structure of the household. I develop and estimate a
model of household insurance bundle choice and medical utilization that accounts for these
features. The results suggest that much of the adverse selection is concentrated within the
household. Counterfactual analysis reveals that under optimal pricing, household bundling
yields significantly higher consumer surplus and insurance enrollment than individual pur-
chase. Furthermore, the insurance market is less susceptible to complete unraveling under
household bundling.
Chapter 3 is entitled Information Control in the Hold-up Problem, and it is a joint work
with Teck Yong Tan. In this chapter, we study the use of information control to mitigate
hold-up risks. Our main result identifies a separation between information that creates ex-
ante investment incentive and information that causes ex-post inefficiency, which then allows
ex-post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex-ante investment incentive.
We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the investment levels
and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.
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The presence of adverse selection in the health insurance market has been studied extensively
in both public and private settings.1 When adverse selection is at the individual level, i.e.,
sicker individuals sort into more generous health insurance plans, the canonical solutions to
reduce market failure are either to price discriminate based on observed individual charac-
teristics that are correlated with risk types or to mandate some degree of pooling beyond
the level sustained by the private market. However, if adverse selection occurs at the house-
hold level, these policies might have detrimental effects on welfare. This chapter studies the
extent to which household decision making and the household structure affect the selection
into health insurance of members within the household in the context of Vietnam’s Social
Health Insurance (SHI) program.
I first document the existence of adverse selection in Vietnam’s SHI at the individual
level using survey data on individual enrollment and medical expenditure. The descriptive
evidence shows that people who buy SHI voluntarily are on average older and incur more
medical costs than the uninsured, which can be consistent with both adverse selection and
moral hazard. I then utilize the structure of the SHI program to separately measure the
extent of adverse selection. Since SHI participants include a group of enrollees who are
mandated into insurance, these participants act as a control group who are not subject to
selection issues. The results suggest that voluntary enrollees have 0.8 more out patient visits
and higher out of pocket expenditure than compulsory enrollees, implying adverse selection
into the program.
While the evidence on individual adverse selection is clear, estimates from an Almost
Ideal Demand System suggest that medical care utilization of different household members
are substitutes, which are only consistent with a household decision making framework. This
1See Cutler (2002) for an extesive review of the literature on the public health care sector.
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implies that the demand for medical care is determined by the household. Hence, the decision
to buy health insurance is also made at the household level.
If adverse selection only occurs across households, i.e., only sicker households choose
to buy health insurance, the difference between household decision making and individ-
ual decision making can be resolved by defining risk type only at the household level. In
Vietnam, however, selection into the SHI program happens both across and within house-
holds. A variance decomposition exercise shows that between 50 and 65% of the variation
in insurance enrollment is due to the within-household selection. Furthermore, much of the
within-household selection cannot be explained by the difference in observed demographics
among household members.
I then explore different factors that affect the selection of health insurance within the
household. I find that the household’s ability to share risk among household members acts
a substitute for formal insurance, lowering the household’s willingness to pay for insurance.
As a result, a member in a multiple-member household is 19 percentage point less likely to
be insured than a member in a single-member household. Larger households are also less
risk averse. The household’s demand for health insurance for each member is also dependent
on the distribution of age within the household. In particular, a household with a greater
number of old members are more likely to buy health insurance for all household members.
The household is also more likely to buy health insurance for the household head, suggesting
the role of preference unrelated to risks in the demand for health insurance.
When the household structure affects the household’s willingness to pay for health in-
surance, it is unclear whether insurance pricing based on individual demographic is always
welfare improving. For example, if each household’s willingness to pay for health insurance
for the entire household is only dependent on the household’s average age, and the average
age of each household is similar across households, differential individual age-based pricing
will generate more adverse selection than uniform pricing. In addition, approaches to in-
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crease pooling such as employment-based insurance might lower the willingness to pay for
health insurance for the population that are not subject to pooling, and increase adverse
selection in the rest of the market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related lit-
erature, and Section 1.3 describes the data and the institutional setting of Vietnam’s SHI
program. Section 1.4 presents the evidence of adverse selection. Section 1.5 shows evi-
dence of household decision making. Section 1.6 discusses how household factors affect the
household’s demand for health insurance, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on identifying the existence of asymmetric information
in insurance markets. The idea of using medical expenditure from people who make different
insurance choices to identify asymmetric information is similar to the more formal positive
correlation test in Chiappori and Salanie (2000). Interestingly, the literature has found
mixed evidence of asymmetric information (Cawley and Philipson (1999); Cardon and Hendel
(2001); Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and several others). Although the positive correlation
test does not distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard, the structure of Vietnam’s
SHI program provides an excellent setting to separately detect adverse selection.
My analysis of Vietnam’s SHI program also contributes to the literature on take up rates
of insurance programs in developing countries. With an underdeveloped market for formal
insurance, adverse selection might not be the only reason for low take-up of insurance prod-
ucts in developing countries. Banerjee et al. (2014), for example, shows that low insurance
take-up in India is not due to adverse selection, and Cole et al. (2013) finds that non-price
frictions are important factors that restrict demand.
My paper is also related to the literature on family economics. There are three different
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approaches to model household decision making. The first approach, the non-cooperative
approach, assumes that individuals in a household make decisions independently. The second
approach, the unitary approach, assumes that all members of the household acts as one single
agent, and the preference of the agent is invariant to the changes in the environment. In
particular, the barganing power of the agents are not affected by changes in prices. The third
approach, the collective approach suggested by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees
(1988), relies on the assumption that the decision process in the household always leads to
Pareto-efficient outcomes. While my findings here are consistent with both the unitary and
collective approaches, the unitary model has been largely rejected in the literature and there
has been evidence that supports the collective approach (Browning and Chiappori, 1998;
Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; Duflo, 2003).
1.3 Institutional Setting and Data
This section outlines institutional details of the SHI program in Vietnam and the overview
of the data.
1.3.1 Social Health Insurance in Vietnam
Vietnam’s SHI is a government-sponsored program, funded by mandatory contributions, vol-
untary premiums, and tax revenues. There are three types of enrollees: compulsory enrollees,
policy beneficiaries, and voluntary enrollees. The compulsory group consists of workers in the
formal sector whose enrollment is mandated and premiums are directly deducted from their
wages. Their employers are required to subsidize 2/3 of the premiums. The policy beneficia-
ries group includes the poor, pensioners, veterans, and children under 6 who receive free SHI.
The rest of the population is eligible to purchase voluntary health insurance at a premium.
It is important to note that the compliance rate of firms in the formal sector is low, hence
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50% of the formal sector workers are not enrolled in compulsory insurance (Somanathan
et al., 2014).2 These individuals are then eligible to purchase voluntary insurance.
For each enrollee type, there is only one insurance contract, which only covers the enrollee
but not his dependents. The SHI contracts differ among enrollee types and also across years.
Table (1.3.1) summarizes the coinsurance structures of SHI contracts in selected years.3 In
general, the SHI contracts feature piecewise-linear coinsurance rates with no deductible and
are more generous for policy beneficiaries. The lack of deductibles and co-payments here
suggests that the government is less concerned about potential moral hazard. SHI does not
cover a certain set of diseases (some of which are paid by another government agency, for
example tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, STDs . . . ), family planning, assisted reproductive
technologies, organ transplantation, vaccination, and cosmetic surgery. It also does not cover
innate disability, occupational disease, traffic accident, suicide, and drug addiction. These
exclusions have stayed the same for all enrollee types and over time.
SHI premiums are set differently for different enrollee types. As previously mentioned,
SHI is free for policy beneficiaries. For compulsory enrollees, pre-subsidized annual individual
premiums are 6% of their annual wage. For voluntary enrollees, annual premiums are indexed
to the minimum wage, which vary across years and geographical areas. The premiums for
voluntary enrollees are also dependent on whether other household members are enrolled in
voluntary insurance and household types.4 Household types are categorized as (1) households
in the agricultural sector, (2) households with at least one compulsory enrollee, and (3) self-
employed households.
2Formal-sector firms in Vietnam subsidize SHI premiums but do not have to bear any costs of medical
utilization. Whether a firm complies and provides compulsory SHI is therefore unlikely to be due to the
health status of their enrollees.
3The selected years are chosen to correspond to the years of the available data. The actual timeline of
these policy changes is summarized in Appendix A.5.
4In Vietnam, each "household" is defined to include all members who are registered in the same address
(the household’s registry). This is similar to the household registry system in China.
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Table 1.3.1: Coinsurance Structures of SHI Contracts
Year Policy Beneficiaries Compulsory Enrollees Voluntary Enrollees
2004 0%
20% If expense is below 15000% For additional expense
20% If expense is below 15000% Otherwise
2006 0%

0% If expense is below 7000
100% For additional expense, but
out-of-pocket costs not
exceeding 4666
40% For additional expense

0% If expense is below 7000
100% For additional expense, but
out-of-pocket costs not
exceeding 4666
40% For additional expense
2008 0%

0% If expense is below 7000
100% For additional expense, but
out-of-pocket costs not
exceeding 4666
40% For additional expense
0% If expense is below 10020% For expense above 100
2010
0% If expense is below 1005% For expense above 100
0% If expense is below 10020% For expense above 100
0% If expense is below 10020% For expense above 100
2012
0% If expense is below 1005% For expense above 100
0% If expense is below 10020% For expense above 100
0% If expense is below 10020% For expense above 100
Note: All units are in KVND. From 2004 to 2008, the out-of-pocket cost is a continuous function of total health expen-
diture. In 2010 and 2012, however, there is a jump in out-of-pocket cost between expense below 100 KVND and above
100 KVND,
The premium structure is summarized in Table (1.3.2) for selected years. In the period
from 2005 to 2007, household bundling was implemented together with a reduction in pre-
mium and a requirement on commune-level participation rates.5 In this period, voluntary
SHI is only available in communes with at least 10% of households fully insured, either
through voluntary SHI or compulsory and free SHI. For each household, all members who
are eligible for voluntary SHI must purchase insurance or no one is insured. Household
bundling was repealed in late 2007 due to a 1.5 million decrease in insurance enrollment.6 In
other years, households could be partially enrolled in insurance but receive greater premium
5Each commune has between 1000 to 10,000 households.
6Evidence from the data suggests that this is mainly due to the commune requirement. More details are
included in Section A.2.
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Table 1.3.2: Premium Structure for Households with Members Eligible for Voluntary
SHI
Year Eligible Member Individual Premium (Non-student)(1) Policy
2004 1 4.5% Individual Purchase2+ 4.275%
2006
1 3.0%




Individual Purchase2 4.5%3 4.05%
4+ 3.6%
Agricultural HH Formal-sector HH Self-employed HH
2010, 2012
1 4.5% 4.5% 4.5 %
Individual Purchase2 4.05%
(2) 4.05% 4.5 %
3 3.6%(2) 3.6% 4.5%
4+ 3.15%(2) 3.15% 4.5%
(1) Student premium is always at 3.15% of minimum wage.
(2) Additional household members only receive lower premiums if the household is fully enrolled in insurance.
Note: All premiums are indexed to the minimum wage. Per the Health Insurance Law of 1998, the maximum individual pre-
mium for voluntary enrollees is capped at 6% of the minimum wage.
discounts when more household members enroll in insurance. This is nonlinear pricing in
the form of bundle size pricing.
As of 2012, there were still 31.9 million Vietnamese who were not enrolled in SHI, ac-
counting for 30% of the population. Among these, 15.7 million were non-poor informal sector
workers, and 6.2 million were formal sector workers (Somanathan et al., 2014). Figure (1.3.1)
shows the percentage enrolled in SHI in each enrollment group. Enrollment is highest among
the poor, pensioners, and civil servants as these groups receive free SHI. Enrollment for chil-
dren under 6 is surprisingly low (approximately 80%), although this group is also qualified
for free SHI. Among people who are eligible for voluntary SHI but excluding students, only
20% are enrolled in SHI. However, insurance enrollment is much higher for students (80%)
since in many schools student SHI is considered a part of tuition fees.
Adverse selection is likely to be the main cause of low SHI take-up in Vietnam. While it
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Figure 1.3.1: Insurance Enrollment by Groups
Source: Somanathan et al. (2014)
has been noted that low take-up of social insurance in general could be due to low quality
of care, stigma, or high administrative costs of either purchasing or utilization, these con-
cerns are less likely to be valid in Vietnam’s SHI context.7 Most health care providers in
Vietnam are public facilities who are required to accept SHI.8 Private providers could also
apply to accept SHI enrollees as long as they meet sufficient quality standards. Most SHI
reimbursement happens at the provider level in which the reduction in payment is directly
applied at the time of payment, hence the administrative cost of utilization is unlikely to be
high. Purchase of SHI is also relatively easy as it does not exclude pre-existing conditions.
Vietnam’s participation in the SHI scheme was part of a larger effort initiated by the
World Bank in the early 2000s. While universal health insurance coverage is a common goal
for many countries, using SHI to achieve this goal is especially relevant to developing nations.
There are two general methods to provide universal health care: free insurance completely
funded by tax revenue, and SHI. SHI can be favored over the tax revenue financing system
7Currie (2004) provides an excellent review of the literature in the US and UK context.
8In some large public hospitals, there are separate facilities that serve only people who opt out of SHI.
However, these facilities are utilized mostly by high income individuals for out-patient services.
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when a country’s tax revenue is insufficient to fund health care (Hsiao et al., 2006). Also, since
SHI only partially relies on the public tax revenue, implementing SHI also frees up public
funds for other health related expenses such as quality improvement. Several developing
countries have chosen to implement SHI, for example Kenya, Ghana, Philippines, Colombia,
Thailand, and Vietnam.9
1.3.2 Data
I obtained data from three main sources: the Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey
(VHLSS) from 2004 to 2012, the administrative data from the Vietnamese Social Security
Agency (VSS) from 2008 to 2012, and the 2013 Multidimensional Poverty Measurement
(MDP) survey. The VHLSS is a survey conducted once every two years on more than 9000
households by the General Statistic Office of Vietnam to monitor living standards. The
survey follows a rolling panel structure in which 50% of households are randomly chosen to
be interviewed in two consecutive waves. The data consists of demographic characteristics of
household members, income, expenditure, education level and information on health status,
health expenditure, as well as health insurance status. The sample of households in VHLSS
is selected as a representative sample of the entire population. I supplement this survey data
with the administrative data on yearly revenue collected from health insurance premium and
payment paid by VSS. The data is grouped by enrollee types and cities from 2008 to 2012.
The MDP survey data contains similar information to the VHLSS data but covers an entire
district of Ho Chi Minh city.
VHLSS Data Table (1.3.3) shows the summary statistics of the data at the individual
level and household level. Households in the sample have on average 4 members, with the
9Multiple advanced nations have also adopted SHI in the past and achieved universal coverage (Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Luxembourg among others (Carrin and James,
2005)).
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Table 1.3.3: Summary Statistics of the Full Sample
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Individual Characteristics
Age 29.70 30.81 31.65 31.20 32.20
(19.84) (20.09) (20.50) (20.49) (20.90)
Female 0.503 0.508 0.507 0.508 0.508
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
College Degree 0.147 0.162 0.181 0.191 0.204
(0.354) (0.368) (0.385) (0.393) (0.403)
Married 0.722 0.720 0.735 0.766 0.779
(0.448) (0.449) (0.441) (0.423) (0.415)
Individual Income 1615.2 2277.7 3428.7 5586.1 8460.3
(4500.6) (6469.6) (9976.4) (14984.6) (20744.4)
Observations 38450 38312 37723 36695 36503
Household Characteristics
HH Average Age 31.55 33.06 33.20 33.73 34.22
(12.21) (12.89) (14.90) (14.27) (16.31)
HH Eldest Member 52.05 53.17 50.69 52.36 50.19
(15.43) (15.09) (18.41) (15.84) (18.71)
HH Size 4.464 4.292 3.817 3.943 3.556
(1.598) (1.579) (1.659) (1.516) (1.579)
Total Household Income 26425.9 33766.8 48817.9 65106.5 92334.1
(24189.2) (34716.3) (64030.2) (115084.9) (100243.6)
Average Income per Member 6382.4 8461.0 15794.6 17804.4 31208.5
(6038.4) (9106.9) (27416.1) (35871.5) (38689.3)
Observations 8619 8926 9885 9308 10266
Individual Medical Utilization
Outpatient visits 0.981 1.220 1.136 1.355 1.240
(2.716) (3.306) (3.259) (3.610) (3.121)
Inpatient visits 0.0938 0.0922 0.0921 0.123 0.108
(0.481) (0.427) (0.433) (0.558) (0.489)
OOP 214.9 240.7 314.2 559.9 684.7
(1580.4) (1533.2) (2574.7) (3365.2) (4105.0)
Medical OOP as Share of Average Income 0.0427 0.0389 0.0347 0.0460 0.0370
(0.325) (0.303) (0.230) (0.295) (0.274)
Observations 38450 38312 37723 36695 36503
Note: The out-of-pocket cost (OOP) is measured in KVND. Average income is measured annually in KVND, calcu-
lated as the total household income divided by the number of household members.
eldest member being 50 years old on average. The aggregate household income per member
is close to the actual nominal GDP per capita, which increases from $606.89 in 2004 to
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$1755.27 in 2012 (World Bank, 2016).10
The average individual in the sample has 1 outpatient visit per year, and pays between
3 to 4% of per-member average income for out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. When the sample is
restricted to only individuals who have at least one doctor visit, which accounts for approxi-
mately 30% to 40% of the total sample, the average number of outpatient visits per year per
individual is 2 (Table A.4.1). Among these people, on average 1 out of 5 individuals needs
an inpatient visit. The OOP costs once medical utilization occurs account for about 10% of
the average per-member income.
The percentages of each enrollee type and the uninsured are summarized in Figure (1.3.2).
Most of the reduction in the number of uninsured individuals comes from the expansion of
the free SHI program. There is also a modest upward trend in voluntary SHI enrollment.
The number of individuals who remained uninsured by 2012 is close to 30% of the sample,
which is similar to the population statistics. The low enrollment rate in 2004 is due to the
partial roll-out of the policy which was implemented only at selected communes.



















10The large increase in income over time reflects the high inflation rates in this period which reached
23.116% in 2008 and 18.677% in 2011. The average individual income is much lower than the GDP per
capita because this statistic does not take into account income from household business which is reported
separately.
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Throughout this paper, I will only focus on the non-student members who are eligible for
voluntary SHI. This is because premiums for student SHI are usually included in tuition fees,
hence households cannot opt out of student SHI. In the data, most students are fully insured
(Figure A.3.5), and most households choose to cover all of its student members (Figure
A.3.4).11 Within-household selection mainly occurs on non-student voluntary members.
The majority of households have some members eligible for non-student voluntary SHI, yet
only 14% of households have some voluntarily non-student insured members. Among these
households, 50% of households are partially covered under SHI (Figure A.3.2 and A.3.3).
MDP Data The MDP survey was a piloted program that collected data from all house-
holds in District 11, Ho Chi Minh city and the poor and near-poor households in three
adjacent districts. Since the area of District 11 is only 5 km2, geographical differences in the
preferences for medical care and health types are less likely to be a concern for the house-
holds in the MDP sample. However, the survey does not contain income and expenditure
data. Table (1.3.4) summarizes the individual and household characteristics of the MDP
data, which are similar to the statistics from the VHLSS sample.
1.4 Evidence of Adverse Selection
Table (1.4.1) shows the summary statistics of individual characteristics between people who
are voluntarily insured and the uninsured in the VHLSS data. The voluntarily insured are
on average older,12 more educated, and earn higher income both at the individual and the
11Figure (A.3.4) also shows that a small fraction of households opt out of student SHI completely. For these
households, I assume that whether the household would like to buy student SHI is part of the household’s
choice set.
12Table (A.3.1) shows the distribution of age between the voluntarily insured and the uninsured in the
MDP data. The age distribution of the voluntarily insured first-order stochastic dominates the age distribu-
tion of the uninsured.
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Table 1.3.4: Summary Statistics of the MDP Sample
Individual Characteristics Household Characteristics
Age 36.05 Average Age 36.07
(20.21) (12.24)
Female 0.533 Eldest Age 54.81
(0.499) (14.59)
College Degree 0.128 Household Size 4.164
(0.334) (2.032)
Observations 280837 Observations 67440
Compulsory and Beneficiaries Percentage 48%
Voluntary Percentage 18%
Uninsured Percentage 34%
household levels. Although voluntary insurees have higher outpatient visits and inpatient
visits than the uninsured, this alone indicates a combination of adverse selection and moral
hazard.
To separate the existence of adverse selection from moral hazard,13 I compare medical
utilization between two groups of enrollees in 2010 and 2012: voluntary enrollees and compul-
sory enrollees. These years were chosen because the coinsurance rates are identical between
the two groups and largely linear. In this period, the coinsurance rate is 0% for medical
expense under 100 KVND,14 and 20% for higher expense.15 The compulsory enrollees are
a valid control group because they do not self-select into insurance. The validity of this
assumption will be discussed in more details in Section 2.4.
13Evidence on moral hazard in Vietnam’s SHI program is included in Appendix A.2.
14Vietnamese Dong (VND) is the local currency. 1 KVND = 1000 VND ≈ 0.04 USD (in 2017).
15Since the average OOP cost in 2010 and 2012, including individuals with no medical utilization, is
560 KVND and 685 KVND respectively (Table 1.3.3), the change in the coinsurance rate at 100 KVND is
unlikely to have a large impact on medical utilization. Even when this nonlinearity is taken into account, the
impact of moral hazard is greater for healthier individuals, which will strengthen any evidence on adverse
selection.
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Table 1.4.1: Summary Statistics of Voluntarily Insured and Uninsured Individuals
(Excluding Students) from VHLSS.





HH Size 4.235 4.623
(1.567) (1.615)
College Degree 0.225 0.131
(0.418) (0.337)
Total Household Income 83518.2 53181.1
(86275.7) (77870.4)
Individual Income 4638.1 3755.7
(13663.2) (9968.4)
Outpatient visits 2.714 1.108
(5.532) (3.126)
Inpatient visits 0.220 0.0746
(0.711) (0.375)
Observations 8575 77703
Panel A of Table (1.4.2) shows the summary statistics of the treatment and control
groups. On average, the treatment group (voluntary enrollees) have lower household income
per member, less educated, and older. To make the groups more comparable, I construct
matched treatment and control groups. Specifically, I use exact matching on age categories,
gender, and whether the individual has a college degree, and nearest-neighbor matching on
household income per member. Panel B of Table (1.4.2) shows the summary statistics of the
matched treatment and control groups.
The average treatment effect on the matched treatment and control groups are summa-
rized in Table (1.4.3). Compared to the control group, the treatment group has 0.8 more
out-patient visits, 0.03 more in-patient visits per year, and higher OOP costs. The results
suggest that people who self-select into insurance have worse health status on average. In
addition, Table (1.4.4) shows that a voluntary enrollee in 2006 is much more likely to have
a chronic condition than the uninsured (19.7% compared to 9.2%). Since chronic conditions
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Table 1.4.2: Summary Statistics of the Control and Treatment Groups
Variable (Panel A) (Panel B)
Treatment Control Difference MatchedTreatment
Matched
Control Difference
Age 47.45 40.36 7.09∗∗∗ 43 43.22 -0.22
(16.6) (15.52) (16.7) (16.6)
Female 0.6 0.5 0.11∗∗∗ 0.54 0.54 0
(0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
HH Size 4.12 4.03 0.08∗∗∗ 4.12 4.02 0.1∗∗∗
(1.55) (1.46) (1.51) (1.51)
College Degree 0.23 0.7 −0.47∗∗∗ 0.51 0.51 0
(0.42) (0.46) (0.5) (0.5)
Log HH Income
(Per Member) 9.97 10.29 −0.32
∗∗∗ 10.15 10.16 -0.01
(0.69) (0.64) (0.67) (0.67)
N 4827 7169 11996 11996
are covered under SHI and there is no exclusion to pre-existing conditions, this could also
be considered a direct evidence of adverse selection in the SHI program.16
Table 1.4.3: The Difference in Medical Utilization between Voluntary and Compulsory
Enrollees in 2010 and 2012
(1) (2) (3)
OPV IPV log(OOP + 1)
ATE 0.793∗∗∗ 0.0269 0.871∗∗∗
(0.0954) (0.0150) (0.0914)
Observations 11996 11996 11996
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
Note: OPV and IPV are the number of out-patient vis-
its and in-patient visits, respectively. As shown in Ta-
ble (1.3.3), the average out-of-pocket spending is approxi-
mately 560KVND, which includes individuals who do not
incur any medical spending. Hence, the addition of 1 into
OOP does not affect the results
16The data on chronic conditions is not available for 2010 and 2012.
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Table 1.4.4: Summary Statistics of Health Indicators between the Voluntarily Insured
and the Uninsured in 2006.
With Voluntary Insurance Uninsured
Smoke 0.255 0.325
(0.436) (0.469)
With Chronic Diseases 0.197 0.0919
(0.398) (0.289)
Observations 1540 15161
1.5 Cross-Member Substitution Effects
One of the key differences between the household demand for medical care and the individual
demand for medical care is that the former exhibits substitution effects between different
members’ medical utilization. In what follows, I use estimates from the Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) to investigate the substitution patterns in
medical utilization of household members. Here, each household is assumed to consume
6 goods, which include a consumption good and medical care for each member category.
Members are categorized as Head of the household,17 Spouse, Children, Parents, and Others.
Consider a household h with nh members who consumes nh + 1 goods which include
medical care for each member and a consumption good for the entire household. The price
of the consumption good ph,j+1 is normalized to 1. The price of each member’s medical care
ph,j is the spot coinsurance rate of medical expenditure, computed as the ratio between the
out of pocket cost and the total cost of medical care for each member. When all medical
expenses are covered in insurance, the spot coinsurance rate is the same as the coinsurance
rate specified in the contract. When some medical expense is not eligible for insurance
coverage, the realized coinsurance rate is strictly smaller.
Let whj with j = 1, 2, . . . n denote the budget share of medical care for member j, and
17The VHLSS survey asks each household to identify the household’s head. This information is also
recorded in the official household’s registry.
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wh,nh+1 denote the budget share of the consumption good. The AIDS specification is given
by:
whi = αhi +
∑
j
γhij log phj + βhi log
Yh
Ph
where αhi, γhij, and βhi are parameters that characterize the demand of medical care for
member i. Specifically, γhij represents the effect of a change in the relative price of medical
care between i and j on the demand for medical care of i. Ph is a price index defined by:
logPh = αh0 +
∑
k







γhkj log phk log phj









βhi = 0, γihj = γjih
I assume that there is no preference heterogeneity among households. That is, γhkj = γkj,
βhj = βj, and αhj = αj. I allow for the average expenditure share of medical care to be
dependent on age groups. Since household compositions (including the number of members
and their relationship to the head of the household) vary, I reduce the number of parameters
by classifying members into 5 categories: (Male) Head of Household, Spouse, Children,
Parents, and Others.18.
Table (1.5.1) presents the estimates of the AIDS in the sample of households who are fully
covered through compulsory or free SHI. This sample restriction eliminates the endogeneity
concern between the price of medical care and the unobserved health types. The estimates
of own-price elasticities are negative and mostly significant. The estimates of cross-price
18That is, there is a single coefficient for each pair of different categories as well as a single coefficient for
pairs of members within a category. For this 5-category case, we have 15 parameters for own-price elasticities
and cross-price elasticities between categories, and additionally 3 parameters for within-category cross-price
elasticities. Note that there is only one member as head of the household, and only one member as the
head’s spouse. An alternative approach is multi-stage budgeting (Hausman et al., 1994).
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Table 1.5.1: Estimates for the Almost Ideal Demand System.
Dependent Variable: Expenditure Shares
Coefficient Mean St. Dev.
Price (Head) −0.067∗∗∗ 0.018
Price (Spouse) −0.048∗∗∗ 0.012
Price (Children) −0.031∗∗∗ 0.008
Price (Parents) −0.008 0.017
Price (Others) −0.029 0.029
Price (Head - Spouse) 0.0002 0.013
Price (Head - Children) 0.012∗∗ 0.006
Price (Head - Parents) 0.0004 0.023
Price (Head - Others) 0.018 0.016
Price (Spouse - Children) 0.006∗∗ 0.003
Price (Spouse - Parents) 0.009 0.012
Price (Spouse - Others) 0.010 0.009
Price (Children - Children) 0.005 0.004
Price (Children - Parents) 0.003 0.007
Price (Children - Others) 0.010 0.008
Price (Parents - Parents) 0.005 0.015
Price (Parents - Others) 0.011 0.017
Price (Others - Others) 0.004 0.016
Income (Head) −0.034∗∗∗ 0.008
Income (Spouse) −0.020∗∗∗ 0.004
Income (Children) −0.012∗∗∗ 0.003
Income (Parents) −0.011 0.009
Income (Others) −0.010 0.011
Note: The sample here is limited to the set of households that are fully cov-
ered under compulsory or free enrollment. This ensures that the observed medical
prices are not correlated with the unobserved health type and health realization.
The number of households in this sample is N = 11112.
elasticities are all positive, suggesting that medical care of different members are substitutes,
but the estimates are less precise. This substitution effect is statistically significant between
the head of the household, his wife and their children.
1.6 Within-Household Selection into Health Insurance
This section documents the effect of the household structure on the selection of individual
enrollment in the SHI program.
Figure (1.6.1) illustrates the enrollment compositions of households in the MDP data
grouped by household sizes. Compared to smaller-sized households, households with more
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Figure 1.6.1: Within-Household Participation in SHI from MDP Data
















members have fewer members being voluntarily insured and similar proportion of uninsured
members. In addition, larger households have more compulsory members on average because
they are more likely to qualify for poor and near-poor status.
Table 1.6.1: Variance Decomposition of Voluntary Insurance Enrollment from MDP Data
Household size (1) (2) (3) N Ind. N HHWithin-HH % Within-HH % Within-HH %
2 65% 66% 65% 9538 6045
3 62% 63% 62% 21515 10803
4 62% 61% 61% 35680 15534
5 58% 58% 57% 25366 8838
6 53% 53% 52% 20386 5717
>7 50% 49% 49% 29802 6409
Observed
Characteristics No Age and Gender Employment
Note: Age is categorized into six categories: < 18, 18− 30, 30− 40, 40− 50, 50− 60, and > 60. Employment
is categorized into position types (owner, self-employed, employee, apprentice, cooperative member, or family
laborer) and duration of contracts (unspecified, 1-3 years, between 3 and 12 months, less than 3 months,
seasonal, and no formal contract).
In order to gauge the importance of within-household selection in insurance, Table (1.6.1)
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decomposes the variance of insurance enrollment across individuals into within and across-
household variance. Within-household variance accounts for between 50 and 65% of the
variance in individual enrollment in the population (Column 1). In other words, more than
half of the variation in insurance enrollment at the individual level occurs within the house-
holds. If within-household selection is purely due to differences in observed characteristics of
household members, the presence of the household itself does not affect the welfare consider-
ation of canonical pricing interventions such as age or employment-based pricing. Columns
(2) and (3) of Table (1.6.1) show the variance decomposition when observed characteristics
of household members are taken into account. The results show that much of the within-
household variation is not due to differences in age, gender, or employment type among
household members.
There are three possible reasons why within-household insurance selection exists. First,
if households pool income and share risks, household’s risk sharing is a substitute for health
insurance, and a household might choose not to buy health insurance for all household
members. Second, a household might only buy health insurance for its sicker household
members, implying within-household adverse selection. Third, a household might value
different member’s utility differently, hence having different willingness to pay for health
insurance for different members conditional on members having similar health risks.
Household Risk Sharing and Risk Preferences Table (1.6.2) shows the effect of house-
hold risk sharing on insurance enrollment. In order to isolate the effect of risk sharing from
the heterogeneity in households’ willingness to pay for individual health insurance, only
households with one member being eligible for voluntary SHI are considered. The control
group includes households with only one member, and the treatment group includes house-
holds with at least one other household member who have compulsory or free SHI. Panel (A)
of Table (1.6.2) shows the characteristics of the individuals who are eligible for voluntary SHI
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in each group. The individuals in the control group are more likely to be disabled and/or
having severe diseases and also more likely to be sick. The matched samples using nearest
neighbor matching (Panel B) are able to correct for these differences as well as the differ-
ence in age from the original samples. The treatment effect is estimated to be -0.46, which
suggests that having other compulsorily insured household members reduce the probability
of having voluntary health insurance by 19 percentage point.
Table 1.6.2: Effect of Household Risk Sharing on Insurance Enrollment
Variable (Panel A) (Panel B)
Treatment Control Difference MatchedControl
Matched
Treatment Difference
Age 44.33 54.44 10.11∗∗∗ 44.71 45.74 0.8∗∗∗
Male 0.46 0.38 0.06 0.44 0.44 0.0
High School 0.21 0.19 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.0
College 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.0
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.04 0.07 0.03
∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0
Sick(2) 0.62 0.72 0.10∗∗∗ 0.62 0.62 0
N 32079 1286 33365 33365
ATE −0.19∗∗∗(0.002)
(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The nearest-neighbor matching criteria also include employment type and contract duration (not reported).
Similarly, Table (1.6.3) considers the effect of household size on insurance enrollment. A
hosuehold is considered large when it has at least 4 members.19 Using exact matching on all
individual observed characteristics, employment types, and health indicators, having a large
household decreases the probability of its members having voluntary health insurance by 2.1
percentage point.
The mechanism for the decrease in willingness to pay due to household risk sharing
could be through either decreasing absolute risk preference or decreasing marginal utility
of medical care consumption when medical care is a normal good. For example, Appendix
A.1 shows that the income elasticity of the demand for medical care is between 0.2 and 0.3,
19The result is robust to different household size thresholds (Table A.4.2, A.4.3, and A.4.4)
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Table 1.6.3: Effect of Household Size on Insurance Enrollment
Variable Treatment Control Difference MatchedSample
Age 40.74 42.54 1.50∗∗∗ 41.52
Male 0.46 0.46 0.01∗∗∗ 0.46
High School 0.15 0.17 0.02∗∗∗ 0.15
College 0.06 0.08 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.02 0.02 0.00
∗∗ 0.02
Sick(2) 0.58 0.60 0.02∗∗∗ 0.58
N 71483 56923 130586
ATE −0.02∗∗∗(0.001)
(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The exact matching criteria also include employment type and contract du-
ration (not reported). Observations are dropped when exact matches are not found
(7820 cases).
suggesting that medical care is a normal good.20 In addition, adjustment in labor supply
decision of other household members can also lead to a lower willingness to pay for health
insurance relative to a single-member household. The 2012 Urban Poverty Survey shows
that approximately 10% of households in Vietnam adjust labor supply decisions when facing
health risks.
Table (1.6.4) shows the effect of within-household age distribution on household members’
probability of getting health insurance. The probability of getting health insurance for
the second-eldest member is, ceteris paribus, between 2.6 and 3.5 percentage point higher
than if he had been the eldest member of the household. Furthermore, at any given age,
the probability of getting health insurance is relatively higher the younger the member is
compared to the rest of the household. This suggests that older households have higher
willingness to pay for health insurance for all household members because the household
carries greater risks.
20More details about the decreasing willingness to pay for health insurance within the household is included
in Chapter 2.
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Table 1.6.4: Effect of Within-Household Age Rank (in Ascending Order) on Insurance
Enrollment
Age Rank Nhh = 2 Nhh = 3 Nhh = 4 Nhh = 5 Nhh = 6 Nhh ≥ 7
2 0.0262∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗ 0.0290∗∗ 0.0353∗
(0.0131) (0.00862) (0.00678) (0.00912) (0.0114) (0.0182)
3 0.0551∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0146) (0.0224)
4 0.0909∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0234)






Observations 9525 21377 35321 25098 20134 9605
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.096 0.091 0.109 0.123 0.128
Other controlled variables include: age categories, relationship within the household, whether
member is disabled or severly sick, whether member is sick within the past 12 months, employment
type, contract duration, and gender. The dropped category is whether a member is the eldest
household member.
Heterogeneity in Preferences Unrelated to Health Risks Table (1.6.5) shows the
effect of being the household’s head on the probability of getting health insurance. The
first three columns of Table (1.6.5) shows the summary statistics of household heads and
other household members. Household heads are on average older and more likely to be male.
They are also less educated than other household members, but this is due to the increase
in the average education level of the younger population. Since the household heads are
older, they are also 3 percentage point more likely to be sick. I then construct a matched
sample using exact matching on all individual observed characteristics, employment types,
and health indicators to eliminate possible bias due to the positive correlation between age
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and whether a member is the household head. The result shows that the household is 2
percentage point more likely to buy health insurance for the household head, and this effect
is statistically signifcant.
Table 1.6.5: Effect of Being the Household Head on Insurance Enrollment
Variable Treatment Control Difference MatchedSample
Age 50.98 37.37 13.52∗∗∗ 43.71
Male 0.54 0.43 0.11∗∗∗ 0.45
High School 0.14 0.17 0.03∗∗∗ 0.14
College 0.05 0.07 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.04 0.02 0.02
∗∗∗ 0.02
Sick(2) 0.67 0.55 0.12∗∗∗ 0.58




(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The exact matching criteria also include employment type and contract du-
ration (not reported). Observations are dropped when exact matches are not found
(21229 cases).
1.7 Conclusion
This paper documents the existence of adverse selection in Vietnam’s SHI program and
how household decision making affects individual enrollment into insurance. I find that
while sicker people are more likely to buy health insurance, suggesting the existence of
adverse selection, other household factors such as household’s bargaining power and the age
of other household members also affect the household’s willingness to pay for one member’s
insurance. This has important policy implications for two reasons. First, in the presence of
household factors, price discrimination based solely on individual characteristics might not
be welfare improving. Second, a policy that pools individuals into insurance might distort
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2.1 Introduction
How can government intervention reduce inefficiency caused by asymmetric information in
the health insurance market? Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), a rich literature
has studied various aspects of this question, ranging from whether and how the govern-
ment should mandate insurance coverage to how subsidies for insurance should be designed.
While much of the literature has focused on incentivizing individuals to make the optimal
insurance choice, in many situations, this choice is made at the household level. What dis-
tinguishes the household as a common decision maker from individual decision making is
that the household is likely to have complete information about its members. Therefore, the
household’s decisions to buy insurance for different members are interdependent. This paper
explores the use of household bundling to reduce adverse selection in insurance markets and
its application to social health insurance programs.
In general, the heterogeneity in individual health types in the population can be decom-
posed into two components: heterogeneity within each household and heterogeneity across
households. When there is only one available health insurance contract, under individual
purchase, households can buy insurance for any subsets of their members. Each household
will then only buy health insurance for its sicker members, resulting in within-household
adverse selection. Under household bundling, either the entire household is insured or no one
is insured, which eliminates within-household adverse selection. However, across-household
adverse selection now arises, whereby only the sicker households buy insurance whereas the
healthier households do not. This can result in some sick individuals who need insurance
the most not having insurance because their other household members are very healthy.
Therefore, whether household bundling can improve upon individual purchase in terms of
welfare and/or insurance enrollment depends on the relative magnitude of within and across
household heterogeneity in health types.
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To starkly illustrate this intuition, suppose that the population is composed of only two
households, A and B, each with two members, of whom one is healthy and one is sick. Under
individual purchase, each household will buy insurance only for its sick member (within-
household adverse selection). However, since two households have identical composition,
they have the same willingness to pay for the first best insurance bundle (no across-household
adverse selection), and thus, the insurer can achieve the optimal social welfare by selling only
the first best insurance bundle under a household bundling scheme.
To see that household bundling can also adversely affect social welfare, suppose now
that household A has two sick members while household B remains with one healthy and
one sick member. Under individual purchase, the three sick members in the population will
buy insurance. On the other hand, under household bundling, only the sicker household
A will buy insurance while the healthier household B drops out of the insurance market
(across-household adverse selection), thus causing the sick member of household B to become
uninsured.
Other factors related to the household demand for medical utilization and risk preferences
also affect the potential welfare gain of household bundling in comparison to individual
purchase. In particular, a household might view insurance contracts for different members
as substitutes. For example, in a household, if the wife is already insured, the household
is able to spend more on the husband’s medical care which decreases the utility gain from
buying insurance for the husband. Thus, the household might not be willing to pay as much
for the husband’s insurance as for the wife’s insurance even if both members have the same
health type. In this case, the premium under household bundling needs to be sufficiently low
to overcome this decrease in the willingness to pay for subsequent insured members. Other
dimensions of heterogeneity in members’ preferences for medical care unrelated to risk types
could also cause households to prefer to only buy insurance for some but not all members,
hence contributing to within-household adverse selection.
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In this paper, I empirically study the welfare effect of household bundling in the context
of the Social Health Insurance (SHI) Program in Vietnam in which adverse selection is
the key issue that contributes to low insurance take-up. SHI is a government-sponsored
program in which enrollment is voluntary for part of the population. The Vietnam setting is
suitable for my study because with an under-developed private market for health insurance,
SHI is the only insurance provider for the majority of the population in Vietnam. This
allows me to abstract from various supply side issues that would complicate the analysis.
My main source of data is a representative rolling-panel sample of households from 2004 to
2012. The data consist of detailed information about each household’s structure, income
and demographics, yearly medical spending and some health indicators of each member, as
well as each household member’s insurance status.
The rationale behind how household bundling of health insurance affects insurance enroll-
ment and welfare is also applicable to other government-sponsored health insurance program.
For example, the Medicare program in the US also suffers from adverse selection (Polyakova,
2016), and thus healthy enrollees choose to buy too little insurance coverage, which can be
mitigated by household bundling. In addition, since Vietnam’s health insurance situation is
similar to that of many other developing countries, the immediate policy implications in this
paper are applicable to health care policy design in other developing nations that are still
struggling with low health insurance coverage.2
I develop a structural model of households’ health insurance choices and medical care that
helps to quantify the source of adverse selection as well as the degree of within and across
household adverse selection. The model extends the commonly used two-stage modeling
approach (Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Carlin and Town, 2009; Einav et al., 2013; Handel,
2013; Bajari et al., 2014) to a household decision making framework. Each household is
2According to the World Bank (Cotlear et al., 2015), 24 developing countries, which include Brazil,
China, and India, are implementing health coverage reforms to expand access to health care.
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assumed to be unitary: there is a representative agent who makes all the decisions for the
household. In the first period, the household makes the health insurance choice for its
members based on its belief about future health shocks. In the second period, the health
shocks are realized, and the household makes the optimal choice of medical care utilization
for each of its members. In my model, besides the unobserved heterogeneity in health
types, adverse selection could also arise from the unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for
medical care among household members.
The household choice model incorporates the stylized features from the data, namely,
the income effect, the cross-member substitution effect, and moral hazard. The household
demand for each member’s medical care is assumed to consist of necessary care and optional
care. The necessary care is the amount of medical care that must be consumed when a
member is sick. A sick member can also consume some optional care if the household has
sufficient income after paying for all of its members’ out-of-pocket costs for necessary care.
The optimal amount of optional care for each household member is dependent on (i) the
household’s residual income, (ii) his coinsurance rate, and (iii) his necessary care. The
cross-member substitution effect arises through the income effect. For example, a member
with a worse health shock requires higher necessary care, thus reducing the household’s
residual income that, in turn, decreases other members’ optional care consumption through
the income effect.
Identification of the parameters in the model exploits the existence of enrollees who have
mandated insurance or receive free health insurance and the variation in coinsurance rates.
Identification is obtained under the following assumptions. First, households have correct
beliefs about the distribution of future health shocks. Second, there exists an income thresh-
old known to the econometrician such that households with incomes under this threshold
do not consume any optional care. Third, the parameters characterizing the demand for
medical utilization and the distribution of individual health types are mutually independent
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and independent of whether health insurance is mandatory, free, or voluntary. I estimate
the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo through Gibbs Sampling.
The results of the estimation reveal that households are not fully enrolled in insurance
because of both the income effect and within-household adverse selection. Due to the income
effect in the demand for medical care, in the absence of any differences in health types and
preferences for medical care between household members, the household’s willingness to pay
for the second member’s insurance is, on average, 49% less than its willingness to pay for
the first member’s insurance. When heterogeneity in preferences and health types is taken
into account, the insurer’s cost of providing insurance for the second member selected into
insurance by the household is, on average, 54% of the cost of providing insurance for the
first household member, implying within-household adverse selection. Most of this within-
household adverse selection is generated by the heterogeneity in health types instead of the
heterogeneity in preferences for medical care utilization. In addition, much of the adverse
selection due to health types is concentrated within each household: the degree of variation
in within-household health types accounts for 40% of the variation in health types across
individuals in the population.
I then use the model to examine the effect of a household bundling policy on welfare and
insurance enrollment in the context of Vietnam’s SHI. In the counterfactual exercises, the
social planner is the sole provider of health insurance and assumed to maximize consumer
welfare. The social planner can subsidize the insurance premium but operates under a budget
constraint. When the social planner can only charge a uniform premium,3 the results suggest
that household bundling leads to a weakly higher demand for insurance and a strictly lower
average cost of providing insurance than individual purchase at any given uniform premium.
This means that the number of individuals who only buy insurance under household bundling
3This means that the premium per member under household bundling is the same for all households,
and the premium per enrollee under individual purchase is the same for all individuals.
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dominates the number of individuals who drop out of insurance due to household bundling.
In addition, the new enrollees are, on average, healthier. Insurance enrollment under the
optimally priced household bundling policy is estimated to be 17.1 million, which generates
a consumer surplus equivalent to 0.28% of Vietnam’s GDP. In comparison, the insurance
enrollment and the consumer surplus under optimally priced individual purchase are 3.5
million and 0.18% of GDP, respectively.4
Can individual purchase with nonlinear pricing perform better than household bundling?
By offering a lower premium per member when a household has multiple members buying
insurance, the social planner can attract a larger number of healthier members into insurance
under individual purchase without restricting households’ choices. However, while nonlinear
pricing under individual purchase can take into account the decrease in the willingness to
pay for additional insurance due to the income effect, it cannot eliminate within-household
adverse selection. This is because the social planner’s cost saving from having healthier
household members in the insurance pool is now offset by the reduction in the insurance
premium. My results suggest that even with nonlinear pricing, the levels of insurance enroll-
ment and consumer surplus under individual purchase are still 11 million and 0.07% of GDP
lower, respectively, than that of household bundling with uniform pricing. This underlines
the large magnitude of within-household adverse selection and its welfare loss in my setting.
Finally, I explore the use of household bundling to prevent market unraveling. If the
government provides a lower level of subsidy for the market, insurance premiums increase,
forcing healthier enrollees to drop out of insurance. This worsens the risk pool and further
increases insurance premiums. If the cycle continues, it is possible that no one is insured,
and the market unravels. In my estimates, the market starts to unravel under individual
purchase when the level of government subsidy is decreased by 50%. However, at this level
4Under the assumption that the social planner only chooses a uniform premium, the optimal premium is
simply the lowest premium that satisfies the budget constraint under the chosen level of government subsidy.
The results here assume that the government provides the same level of subsidy as in its 2012 policy.
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of subsidy but under household bundling, insurance enrollment remains at 16.3 million,
generating a consumer surplus equivalent to 0.15% of GDP. This suggests that the market
is less susceptible to market unraveling under household bundling than under individual
purchase.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related literature.
Section 2.3 presents my empirical framework while Section 2.4 discusses the identification
and parameterization of the model. The results of the structural estimation are provided
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 analyzes the welfare impact of household bundling policies, and
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several distinct literatures. The modeling approach in this paper is
built upon a rich literature that studies the demand for health insurance using a two-stage
approach (Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Carlin and Town, 2009; Einav et al., 2013; Handel,
2013; Bajari et al., 2014) and extended to a household framework. In these papers, the
willingness to pay for insurance is jointly determined by the demand for medical utilization
and risk preferences, with both being explicitly modeled. While my model retains common
features from the literature such as the effect of income and moral hazard on the demand
for medical care, the focus of the paper is on the interactions within the household. In this
paper, the medical care of a household member is dependent on other household members’
medical spending, which is modeled through the effect of income. This interdependence
translates into a nonlinear relationship in the household’s willingness to pay for insurance
for its members. Although much of my analysis centers on selection on health types, the
model is rich enough to also allow for selection on moral hazard (Einav et al., 2013) and
risk aversion (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2007). My paper is not the
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first to estimate the demand for insurance in a household context. Bundorf et al. (2012) and
Ho and Lee (2017), for example, estimate the choice of plans at the household level using
aggregate measures of household characteristics. While their approach is suitable for settings
in which the household is assumed to always choose a single plan for all of its members (i.e.
employer-sponsored health insurance), my model allows the household to make different
insurance choices for different household members.
My analysis on the effect of household bundling on social welfare also contributes to
a growing literature on market design in markets with asymmetric information (Akerlof,
1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In the classical framework of Akerlof (1970), mandated
full insurance is socially optimal when there is no moral hazard or other dimensions of
heterogeneity that affect the optimal contract for each individual. When this condition
is violated, mandated full insurance is unlikely to be optimal and could be detrimental to
welfare (Einav et al., 2010). In other settings where a mandate is not feasible, the government
could intervene by providing premium subsidies (Ericson and Starc, 2015; Tebaldi, 2016;
Jaffe and Shepard, 2017) to encourage low-risk individuals to enroll. Other works have
also considered policies that target dimensions of consumer demand other than risks such
as consumers’ inertia (Handel, 2013) and information frictions (Handel et al., 2015). My
paper provides an alternative policy that exploits the fact that the household has complete
information about its members, which is largely unexplored in the literature.
The intuition of using household bundling to reduce adverse selection in insurance markets
is closely related to the well-known literature on product bundling. Household bundling is a
form of product bundling when insurance for each household member is considered a separate
product. However, the application of bundling to social health insurance in this paper
highlights interesting deviations from the traditional bundling literature. First, although
product bundling has been shown to almost always increase the monopolist’s profit since it
reduces the heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay (Long, 1984; Schmalensee, 1984;
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Fang and Norman, 2006; Chen and Riordan, 2013), the effect of bundling on social welfare
is ambiguous. In a social health insurance setting, the social planner is solving a Ramsey
pricing problem (Ramsey, 1927) and not just maximizing profits. Second, in any insurance
market, adverse selection on risk types affects both the demand for insurance and the average
cost of providing insurance. Therefore, the effect of any bundling policy will depend not only
on the insurance enrollment but also on the composition of the insurance pool. Third, while
much of the literature on bundling has assumed that the valuation of a bundle is the sum of
the valuations for consuming the items in isolation (with the notable exception of Armstrong
(2013)), this assumption is likely to be violated when applied to health insurance, due both
to risk preferences and the characteristics of the demand for medical care. In my model,
insurance plans for different household members are substitutes due to the income effect in
the household’s demand for medical care.
2.3 Model
This section presents a model of household health insurance choice and demand for medical
care, incorporating the features that were established in the previous section. The model
extends the commonly used two-stage modeling approach to a unitary household framework
where each household has a representative agent - henceforth the decision maker (DM) -
who makes all the decisions on behalf of the household. Medical care is modeled as a good
whose demand depends on the underlying health shock, the coinsurance rate of medical care,
and the household income. In this section, I abstract away from some empirically-relevant
details that are introduced later.
Let h denote a unitary household with nh members and household income Yh. Let
subscript j denote a member of the household, and let bold symbols denote vectors of
household variables. The household consumes a basket of nh+1 goods. This basket includes
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a consumption good ch, whose price is normalized to 1, and all members’ medical care
utilization mh := (mhj)j=1,2,...,n, where mhj is member j’s medical utilization in monetary
value.
Next, the health shocks of household h are denoted by θh := (θhj)j=1,2,...,nh , where θhj is
the health shock of member j. When θhj = 0, member j is healthy and does not require any
medical care. When θhj > 0, θhj is the amount of necessary medical care in monetary value
that is required for member j. The household’s belief about the distribution of θh is denoted
by Fθh . Finally, an insurance bundle for household h is represented by κh := (κhj)j=1,2,...,nh ,
where κhj ≤ 1 is the coinsurance rate of member j. For example, κhj = 1 means that j has
no insurance, while κhj = 0 means that j has full insurance.
The time line is as follows. In period 1, given the set of available insurance bundles,
the DM chooses a bundle κh and incurs a premium of pi (κh).5 In period 2, health shocks
θh are realized. Given the health shocks and the insurance bundle chosen in period 1, the
DM then chooses the consumption basket (ch,mh). Let Uh (ch,mh|θh) be a weighted sum
of all the household members’ utility under consumption basket (ch,mh) and health shocks
realization θh. The objective of the DM is to maximize the ex-ante expected value of Uh.
2.3.1 Period 2: Choice of Medical Care Utilization
Using backward induction, I first solve for the DM’s optimal consumption in period 2. Taking
the insurance bundle κh and the health shocks θh as given, the DM’s utility maximization
problem is:
U∗h (θh, Yh,κh) := maxch,mh Uh (ch,mh|θh)
5Note that in Vietnam’s SHI setting, each household takes the coinsurance rate under insurance as given
but could choose to buy insurance for any subset of its members. For example, if the coinsurance rate is
20%, a household of size 2 can choose the following bundles {(1, 0.2), (0.2, 1), (1, 1), (0.2, 0.2)}.
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subject to the budget constraint: ch + mh · κh ≤ Yh − pi (κh). The right hand side of the
budget constraint is the net household income after paying for the insurance premium, and
the left hand side is the expenditure of the consumption good and the OOP costs of medical
care.
As mentioned previously, the (Marshallian) demand for medical care of member j should
exhibit income effect, moral hazard, and cross-member effects. By the integrability theorem
(Hurwicz, 1971), the ordinal utility function U can be pinned down if the demand system of
the household is known. Thus, I will directly make assumptions on the demand system to
exhibit these properties; Appendix B.3 provides the details to recover the underlying utility
function Uh.
Let the residual income of the household be:
R (θh, Yh,κh) := Yh − pi (κh)− θh · κh − (subsistence expenditure)
The residual income is the remaining of household income after paying for the health in-
surance premium pi (κh), the total OOP costs of necessary care for all household members
θh · κh, and the subsistence expenditure.6 I assume that the demand for medical care takes
the following functional form:
mhj (θh, Yh,κh) = θhj︸︷︷︸
Necessary medical care
+ δhjθhj






The demand of medical care consists of two components: a necessity component, which
is the same as the health shock θhj, and an optional component. The optional care exhibits
all three features: (1) income effect, (2) moral hazard, and (3) cross-member substitution
6Following Xu et al. (2003), the subsistence expenditure is calculated as the expenditure on food for
households between the 35 and the 55 percentile of income.
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effect. First, the optional care is positive and dependent on the household income only if the
household has positive residual income R(), in other words, if the household is sufficiently
wealthy. Second, the amount of optional care for each member is negatively affected by
his coinsurance rate κhj, implying moral hazard. Third, if a household member has higher
coinsurance rate of medical care, the household has to pay more OOP cost for his necessary
care, lowering the residual income and reducing the amount of optional care for all other
household members. This implies that the amount of medical care of different members are
substitutes.7
The income elasticity of medical care is represented by ωh > 0, which is common across
all household members within a household h. The demand for medical care of different
household members can exhibit different degrees of moral hazard, which is characterized by
the moral hazard coefficient γhj > 0. The functional form of this moral hazard is chosen
such that there exists an upper bound on medical utilization when medical care is free
(coinsurance rate is 0), which also implies that the marginal utility of medical care is zero
for sufficiently high amount of spending.8 I also allow for an individual-household-specific
weight δhj, which represents the bargaining weight of each household member, to allow for
different levels of optional care relative to the necessary care. In addition, the optional care
is assumed to be linearly dependent on the necessary care.9
7To see this, note that when κ˜hj > κhj , the household needs to be given an additional amount of income
∆Y > θhj(κ˜hj −κhj) in order to afford the original basket under κhj . This implies that m˜hi > mhi for i 6= j.
8An alternative way to prevent infinite consumption at zero price is an utility function that exhibits a
bliss point (for example, see (Einav et al., 2013)). The only advantage of the functional form chosen in this
paper is that it generates a convenient indirect utility function for a multiple household model as will be
shown later.









, the estimated α is very close to 1.
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Next, the resulting indirect utility function (See Appendix B.3) is:10







1−γhj if R(θh, Yh,κh) > 0
R(θh, Yh,κh)− u Otherwise
(2.2)
When the residual income is positive, the first term of Equation (2.2) is an increasing function
of the residual income and thus could be considered the indirect utility from income. The
second term is an increasing function of each member’s health shock and also an increasing
function of the price of medical care. This disutility is normalized such that when medical
care is free, the disutility degenerates to 0. This implies that any disutility from sickness
disappears when an individual receives enough medical care.
When the residual income is non-positive, the household only consumes the necessary
care. The disutility from being sick here is equivalent to an income loss from having to
pay for the necessary care. In this case, the residual income needs to be normalized by a
sufficiently large constant u > 0 to ensure that the utility is increasing in Yh.
2.3.2 Period 1: Choice of Health Insurance
The household’s risk preference is parameterized by a CARA function with a household-
specific risk parameter rh. Let Kh be the set of insurance bundles offered.11 The DM’s





− rhU∗ (θh, yh,κh)
)
(2.3)
10Note that this is only unique up to a monotone transformation.
11To be precise, the set of insurance bundles available to each household is only household-specific because
household has different sizes.
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Equation (2.3) yields characterizations of the willingness to pay for insurance in terms of
risk aversion rh, distribution of health shocks Fθhj , the moral hazard coefficient γhj, and the
weight of the optional care δhj. For any member, the household has higher willingness to pay
for insurance if its risk aversion is higher, if the household’s belief about his health shock is
worse, or if the weight of the optional care is higher. The comparative static with respect
to the moral hazard coefficient γhj is less straightforward. The presence of γhj increases the
willingness to pay for insurance since an insured individual is going to increase his medical
utilization due to the price decrease of medical care. At the same time, the individual’s
flexibility in medical utilization suggests that the household’s marginal utility of his medical
care is relatively low, lowering the household’s willingness to pay for his insurance. In my
model, the latter effect dominates the former, and the household’s willingness to pay for
insurance is a decreasing function of γhj.
More importantly, even when all household members have identical preferences for med-
ical care (γhj, δhj) and distribution of health shocks Fθhj , the household’s willingness to pay
for the second member’s insurance is lower than that of the first.12 In other words, health
insurance for different members are substitutes. The intuition is the following. When the
household chooses to insure the first member, the household expects to have more residual
income in the second period. Since medical utilization has decreasing marginal utility, the
benefit of having insurance thus being able to consume more medical care for the second
member becomes less significant.13
Implication of Within-household Selection In my model, when the price of insurance
for every household member is the same, the household could choose to be partially insured
12This substitutability arises only from the income effect of the demand for medical care because of the
CARA assumption on risk preferences. An alternative specification such as CRRA would lead to a decrease
in willingness to pay even without income elasticity (ωh = 0).
13Using similar logic, the household has lower willingness to pay for one member if other members become
healthier.
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due to one of the following factors. First, the household believes that some members are
sicker and have worse health shocks. Second, the household might only buy insurance for
members who have high bargaining weight δhj and hence higher optional medical care. In
both cases, the cost of providing insurance for the additional member is lower than that of
the first, corresponding to within-household adverse selection.
On the other hand, partial enrollment in insurance does not necessarily imply within-
household adverse selection. Due to the income effect, the household might be partially
insured even when all members are identical. In this case, having more household members
into insurance does not affect the average cost of providing insurance. In addition, in the
extreme case in which selection into insurance only occurs due to the differences in the degree
of moral hazard, the cost of providing insurance for the additional member is higher for the
insurer, implying advantageous selection.14
2.4 Identification and Estimation





and risk preference rh are identified under parametric assumptions on the
household’s belief about health shocks.
Throughout this section, I assume that the household’s beliefs about the distribution of
health shocks are correct, and the household’s preference parameters (ωh,γh, δh) are con-
stant over time. Identification is achieved in two steps. In the first step, the data on medical
utilization is used to recover the parameters that characterize the household’s demand for
medical care. In the second step, the data on insurance choice combined with some assump-
tions on risk preferences identify both the household’s beliefs about health shocks and the
14Einav et al. (2013) provides an alternative functional form that gives rise to (adverse) selection in moral
hazard. In Vietnam’s SHI context, there is no clear evidence of whether advantageous or adverse selection
in moral hazard occurs.
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distribution of risk aversion. In Appendix B.4, I show how identification can be achieved
without Equation (2.1) but will require more data.
2.4.1 Identification
In the data, a household is only observed for at most two periods, and the household could
choose among at most 2nh insurance bundles, each of which specifies the set of voluntarily
insured household members. An individual could belong to the compulsory group, the policy
beneficiaries group, or be eligible for voluntary SHI. There is also substantial variation in
coinsurance rates across enrollee types and years (Table 1.3.1).
Let Zhj be an indicator variable, taking a value of 0 if an individual has compulsory or
free health insurance. Let Xhj denote a vector of observed characteristics of individual j in
household h, and Xh denote a vector of observed characteristics of household h. Note that
both Xhj and Xh do not include household income Yh. Let qs(Xhj) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability
that an individual with observed characteristics Xhj has θhj > 0. The household’s belief
about θhj is parameterized as the following:
θhj =

0 With probability qs(Xhj)
∼ logN(θ¯hj, σθ) With probability 1− qs(Xhj)
For individuals with similar observed characteristics Xhj, the only difference in their dis-
tribution of health shocks is represented by θ¯hj. Thus, any unobserved heterogeneity in θ¯hj
indicates adverse selection in health types, and θ¯hj is henceforth termed as the individual’s
health type. In addition, conditional on θ¯h, the realizations of the health shocks θh are as-
sumed to be independent across household members. The mixed distribution was empirically
motivated as a large fraction of individuals in the data has no medical utilization, and the
distribution of OOP costs once medical utilization occurs is highly skewed.
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The household’s risk aversion rh is assumed to be log-normally distributed:
rh ∼ logN (Xhβr, σr)
Assumption 1.
a) δhj, γhj, ωh, and θ¯hj are mutually independent conditional on Xhj.
b) (δhj, γhj, ωh, θ¯hj) ⊥ Zhj, Yh|Xhj.
c) The distributions of (δhj, γhj, ωh, θ¯hj) can be identified from their integer moments.
Assumption (1.a) is needed because of the nonlinearity of θhj in Equation (2.1). Assump-
tion (1.b) implies that there is no selection into enrollment types, which also suggests that
there is no selection into job types based on preferences for medical care or health types.
This assumption is likely to be valid in Vietnam’s SHI context. This is because as of 2004
(the beginning of the data sample), both voluntary SHI and compulsory SHI are available.
Furthermore, the premium of compulsory SHI is indexed to the individual wage, which is
higher than the minimum wage. Hence, compulsory SHI’s premiums are higher than that of
voluntary SHI (Table B.6.9). In addition, the cost-sharing policy for the two enrollee types
are largely similar.15 Assumption (1.b) also assumes that the distribution of the preference
parameters and health shocks are independent of household income conditional on observed
characteristics. This assumption is necessary to identify the income effect.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption (1), the distributions of δhj, γhj, ωh are identified.
In our setting, the income effect is highly nonlinear in the latent health shock θhj and the
income elasticity ωh, preventing us from directly applying previous work in the literature on
15In another setting such as the employer-sponsored health insurance market in the US, this assumption
is unlikely to hold. For example, Madrian (1994) found that people are less likely to switch jobs to retain
their health insurance provided by the current firm.
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identification of nonlinear random coefficient model, especially on continuous demand system
(for example, Lewbel and Pendakur (2017)). Instead, identification here is achieved for each
parameter sequentially using only the sample with exogenous insurance status (Zhj = 0).
I also normalize the average household income to 1. In the first step, data on individuals
with full insurance whose family members did not incur any medical care and with average
household income (Yh = 1) is used to identify the distribution of δhj. In the second step,
the distribution of income elasticity ωh is identified from the variation in medical care of the
same set of individuals but at different income levels. In the third step, the distribution of
moral hazard γhj is identified using the now known distribution of δhj, ωh and the variation
in coinsurance rates.
In these steps, the parameterization of the household’s belief about θhj is not required.
The distribution of θ¯hj is also not identified. This is because there is no information about
health types for individuals with exogenous insurance status, and only the unconditional
distribution of θhj can be identified. The parameters (βr, σr, σθ) characterizing the para-
metric distribution of θhj and rh are then identified parametrically from households’ choices
of insurance bundle.
2.4.2 Estimation
The main computational challenge involves the estimation of the expected indirect utility
(Equation 2.3), which determines the household’s choice of the optimal insurance bundle. In
a multiple-member household, the computation of the household’s indirect utility involves
integrating over the household’s belief of all household members’ health shocks. In addition,
since I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in all demand parameters (ωh,γh, δh) as well as
risk aversion rh, approaches such as maximum likelihood or method of moments require inte-
gration of the random coefficients for all combinations of household and individual observed
characteristics. Because household compositions vary, these methods are computationally
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burdensome. Thus, I opt for a Bayesian approach using Gibbs sampler with Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (HMC) (Neal et al., 2011). HMC converges much faster than the traditional
Metropolis-Hasting algorithm but requires the computation of the posterior’s gradient. HMC
sampling is done in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2016).
To aid with estimation, I assume additional distributional assumptions on (ωh, δh,γh) as
the following:
ωh ∼ logN (Xhβω, σω)
δhj ∼ logN (Xhjβδ, σδ)
γhj ∼ logN (Xhjβγ, σγ)




The health types of members within a household are allowed to be correlated and follow
a multivariate normal distribution:






λh ∼ N (0, σλ) is the household-specific type and uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic shocks
hj, where hj ∼ N (0, σ).16 Wh := (Whj)j=1,...,nh represents the effect of the household’s
common shock to each household member. Whj is linearly dependent on member’s observed
characteristics Whj = XhjβW . Since we could always rescale Wh by rescaling λh, σλ is
16When a household is observed for two periods, I assume that the preference parameters ωh, rh, γhj , and
δhj are constant over time. Members’ health types could be serially correlated through the serial correlation
in λht. Although I do not directly estimate this serial correlation since it is not the focus of my analysis, the
estimation relies on the unconditional distribution of λht, and hence my estimates are consistent with any
process of λht as long as it is stationary.
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normalized to 1. The covariance matrix of the household’s health types is then given by:
Ωh = WhW ′h + σ2
In the empirical framework of Section 2.3, there is no uncertainty about the coinsurance
rate in the second period. In the data, however, I observe that most insured individuals pay
more than the coinsurance rates of the insurance contract because some medical expenses
are not covered under SHI. Let ζhj ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of annual medical expense that is
eligible for insurance coverage, the actual out-of-pocket coinsurance rate is given by:
κ˜hj = (1− ζhj) + ζhjκhj
For example, if the coinsurance rate specified in the insurance contract is 0.2, and all medical
expenses are eligible for insurance coverage, ζhj = 1, and κ˜hj = κhj = 0.2. If only 40% of
medical expenses are eligible for insurance coverage, ζhj = 0.4, and κ˜hj = 0.6 + 0.4 × 0.2 =
0.68. While ζhj is observed for 2008, it is not observed for other years. It is therefore assumed
that the distribution of ζhj is the same across years and parameterized as the following:
ζhj =

0 With probability p0(Xhj)
1 With probability p1(Xhj)











) . I also assume
that households have correct beliefs and no private information about the distribution of
ζhj. This parameterization essentially assumes that households know for certain that some
diseases are covered and some are not covered. However, for other diseases, households do not
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Table 2.4.1: Summary of Parameters for Estimation
Parameters Notes
Distribution of Health Types and Health Shocks
βθ Mean shifter for the average health types
σ Distribution of individual-specific component
βW Effect of HH-specific component on health types
σθ Uncertainty in the distribution of health shocks
βs Mean shifter for the probability of sickness
Preference for Medical Utilization
βω Mean shifter for income elasticity
σω SD of unobserved heterogeneity in income elasticity
βγ Mean shifter for moral hazard
σγ SD of unobserved heterogeneity in moral hazard
βγ Mean shifter of the weight of optional care
σγ SD of unobserved heterogeneity in the weight of optional
care
Risk Preference
βr Mean shifter for risk aversion
σr SD of unobserved heterogeneity of risk aversion
Probability of Insurance Coverage
β0ζ , β
1
ζ Probability of zero and full coverage
know whether the diseases are covered or not. As shown in Figure (A.3.6), the majority of
individuals either receive no coverage or complete coverage, therefore the uniform distribution
assumption does not have a large effect on the estimation.
The object of interests are summarized in Table 2.4.1. Conditional on these hyper-
parameters, (θ¯h, ωh, rh, δh, γh) can be drawn independently across households. The parame-
ters characterizing the probability of an individual being sick βs and the distribution of ζhj
are estimated independently of the other parameters using the observed data on whether the
individual incurred any medical utilization and the actual coverage probability. The detailed
sampling algorithm for all parameters is included in Appendix B.1.
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2.5 Results
Table (B.6.2) in the Appendix presents the estimates of all parameters from the model. Table
(2.5.1) shows the implied distributions of the parameters characterizing the preferences for
medical care as well as households’ risk preferences, the distribution of health types, and the
distribution of medical care consumption.
Table 2.5.1: Implied Quantities of Preference, Health Shocks, and Medical Care
Variable Mean St. Dev. 25 pct 50 pct 75 pct
Moral Hazard Coefficient (γ) 0.758 0.293 0.549 0.707 0.909
Income elasticity (ω) 0.589 0.381 0.329 0.494 0.739
Risk Aversion Coefficient (r) 1.006 0.026 0.990 1.008 1.023
Health Types (θ¯) -5.309 1.361 -6.215 -5.292 -4.382
Medical Care (KVND) Mean St. Dev. 75 pct 95 pct
Necessary Medical Care 441.8 2, 541.9 132.7 1, 893.6
Medical Care - Full Insurance 652.9 3, 950.8 179.6 2, 729.3
Medical Care - No Insurance 539.7 2, 896.5 161.6 2, 361.1
Medical Care - Current Contract 566.9 3, 204.1 164.8 2, 436.1
Necessary Medical Care (>0) 1, 216.9 4, 105.3 946.7 4, 656.1
Medical Care - Full Insurance (>0) 1, 798.2 6, 397.9 1, 340.1 6, 913.6
Medical Care - No Insurance (>0) 1, 486.6 4, 658.3 1, 179.2 5, 808.4
Medical Care - Current Contract (>0) 1, 561.5 5, 169.5 1, 206.8 6, 054.4
Medical Care (% of HH Income) Mean St. Dev. 75 pct 95 pct
Necessary Medical Care 1.1 7.2 0.3 4.6
Medical Care - Full Insurance 1.4 8.6 0.4 6.0
Medical Care - No Insurance 1.2 7.4 0.4 5.3
Medical Care - Current Contract 1.3 7.7 0.4 5.5
Necessary Medical Care (>0) 3.1 11.8 2.2 11.9
Medical Care - Full Insurance (>0) 3.9 13.8 3.0 15.2
Medical Care - No Insurance (>0) 3.4 12.0 2.7 13.5
Medical Care - Current Contract (>0) 3.5 12.4 2.7 13.9
Note: The current contract is the 2012 SHI contract for each enrollee type. The full insurance contract has
κhj = 0 with complete coverage.
The average moral hazard coefficient γ is estimated to be 0.758, which implies an arc-
elasticity on optional care of -0.248. This is similar to previous estimates in the literature,
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which are between -0.1 and -0.4 (Chandra et al., 2010).17 My estimates suggest that moral
hazard exists but does not have a big impact on medical care consumption. On average,
household members spend 113 KVND more when switching from being uninsured to having
full insurance.18 This represents a 17% increase in total medical care consumption.
The average income elasticity ω is 0.589. This is higher than the reduced form correlation
found in Section A.1, which was between 0.204 and 0.316. It is important to note that both
the moral hazard coefficient γ and income elasticity ω only affect the optional care. The
total effect on medical care, which includes necessary care, will therefore be lower because
the necessary care does not respond to changes in coinsurance rates or income. The average
risk aversion coefficient is 1.0. To understand its magnitude, consider a household with the
average income (Yh = 1) who has a financial risk that might occur with 50% probability.
If the risk occurs, the household will lose 5% of their household income. In this case, the
estimated risk coefficient implies that the household is willing to pay 3.56% of their income
to insure against this risk.
The average necessity care for each individual is 441.8KVND and accounts for 1.1% of
household income. Under the observed 2012 insurance contract, the amount of medical care
consumed for each household member is approximately 1.3% of the household income. Total
medical care consumption of the household is on average 5.2% since each household has on
average 4 members (Table 1.3.3). This estimate is similar to other aggregate measures of
national health expenditure of Vietnam. For example, the World Bank estimated that health
expenditure in Vietnam is between 5% to 7% of GDP in the 2004-2012 period (World Bank,
2016). The estimates also suggest that health shocks could be a significant financial burden
once they occur. When θhj > 0, the average necessary medical care is equivalent to 3.1% of
17Following Keeler and Rolph (1988), the arc elasticity is defined as (m2−m1)/(m1+m2)/2(κ2−κ1)/(κ1+κ2)/2 . In this calcula-
tion, the arc-elasticity is measured as the change from uninsured to complete insurance (κ2 = 0, κ1 = 0).
18This means that coinsurance rate is 0%, and all medical expenses are covered in the insurance contract.
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household income. At the 95th percentile, the amount of necessary medical care required is
11.9% of household income.
Within-Household Selection and the Source of Selection There are two potential
sources of selection that could explain households’ partial insurance enrollment: (1) hetero-
geneity in members’ preferences for medical care (γh, δh), and (2) heterogeneity in health
types θ¯h.
To study the source of selection, for each household I first identify two members for
whom the household has the highest willingness to pay (WTP) for full insurance, assuming
that the household could only buy insurance for at most one member. The two members
are henceforth termed the first and the second member. Under adverse selection, the cost
of providing full insurance for the first member must be higher than the cost of providing
full insurance for the second member. Panel (a) of Figure (2.5.1) graphs the distribution of
the difference in the cost of providing full insurance for the two members for all households
under the estimated distribution of health types and preferences for medical care. Panel (b)
graphs the distribution under the assumption that there is no difference in the preferences
for medical care within each household, and (γh, δh) are assumed to take the mean value of
the actual draws within each household. Panel (c) assumes that there is no heterogeneity in
health types. That is, the health type of each household member θ¯hj is assumed to take the
mean value of the actual draws of θ¯h.
When full heterogeneity is allowed, the difference between the cost of providing full
insurance for the first and the second members is on average 260 KVND, approximately
59% of the average necessary care (Panel a). This suggests that within-household adverse
selection exists. When the within-household heterogeneity in the preferences for medical
care is removed, the average difference in the cost of insurance is 270 KVND (Panel b).
The increase in the average difference from 260 KVND to 270 KVND when the preference
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Figure 2.5.1: Distribution of Difference in the Expected Cost of Providing Full Insur-
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No Within−HH Heterogeneity in Health Types
Note: Black lines represent the mean of the distribution
heterogeneity is eliminated implies that there is a small degree of selection on moral hazard.19
19As previously mentioned, the parametric assumption on the demand for health insurance exhibits an
advantageous selection in moral hazard.
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The largest change occurs in Panel (d), which eliminates all heterogeneity in health
types within each household. The average difference in the cost of providing full insurance
in this case is only 30 KVND, 12% of the original difference in Panel (a). This suggests that
within-household adverse selection is mainly caused by the heterogeneity in health types.
Within and Across Household Adverse Selection According to Table (2.5.2), within-
household variance accounts for 40% of the total variance in health types, implying significant
within-household adverse selection. In addition, a large portion of both the within and across
household variance cannot be explained by observed individual and household characteristics.
For example, only 43% of the within-household variance is due to the difference in age among
household members. Variation in household size and household age composition explains
only between 1% to 4% of the total across-household variance. These results suggest that
even if the government can price based on observed individual and household characteristics,
both within and across household adverse selection cannot be fully resolved.




Due to Age Differences 0.30 43.08%
Across-Household
Total 1.07 60.46%
Due to Household Size 0.02 1.51%
Due to Number of Members above 65 0.01 1.24%
Due to Number of Members under 18 0.04 3.44%
Total Variance 1.77
Income Effect and the Substitutability of Insurance As mentioned in Section 2.3,
the role of income effect here is twofold. First, it rationalizes the difference in the consump-
tion of medical care across households with different income level. Second, it affects the
household’s willingness to pay for an additional member’s insurance. Figure (2.5.2) depicts
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the distribution of the willingness to pay for the first and the second full insurance, assum-
ing that all household members have identical preferences for medical care and identical
distribution of health shocks. The average decrease in WTP is estimated to be 370 KVND,
approximately 84% of the average necessary care.
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Note: Black line represents the mean of the distribution.
Model Fit In the following, I compare the predicted and actual distribution of OOP costs
and insurance enrollment on the set of households that were excluded from estimation. These
are households that have at least 1 member eligible for voluntary SHI under the household
bundling policy of 2006.
This out-of-sample fit exercise serves two purposes. First, since this sample includes
only households with members eligible for voluntary SHI, a reasonable out-of-sample fit
provides reassurance for the assumption on no selection on enrollee types (Assumption 1.b).
Furthermore, it also alleviates concerns about possible non-monetary costs associated with
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household bundling that are not being modeled. An example of such cost could be the
cost of providing evidence of household membership, or evidence that some members have
compulsory SHI or are policy beneficiaries.
The results of the out-of-sample fit are reported in Table (2.6.1). The average OOP cost
is predicted to be 225.2 KNVD, close to the actual OOP cost of 226.1 KVND. The fit across
different age group is also reasonable. The model slightly under-predicts the average OOP
cost for households in the second income quantile (218.5 KVND compared to 184.5 KVND),
and over-predicts for the forth income quantile (242 KVND compared to 354 KVND). The
predicted insurance enrollment is 16.24%, within 95% confidence interval of the actual en-
rollment rate of 15.77%. The model also performs reasonably in predicting enrollment for
different age groups and income groups and other demographics.
In Table (B.6.3) in the Appendix, I report the actual and in-sample prediction of OOP
costs for the entire sample and each subgroup of the population. The model predicts an
average OOP cost of 425.33 KVND, comparable to the actual sample average of 384 KVND.
The over-estimation of spending concentrates at households with lower income and indi-
viduals above the age of 64. The in-sample prediction of insurance enrollment is 11.9%,
slightly higher than the actual enrollment rate of 9.6%. This again is a consequence of the
over-prediction of medical spending across low income households. It is important to note
that household income only affects medical spending and insurance enrollment through the
income effect and does not enter as mean shifters of any parameters.
2.6 Effect of Household Bundling Policy
This section studies the welfare consequence of a household bundling policy using the results
from the structural household choice analysis. In the counterfactual exercises, I assume that
the social planner, who is the sole provider of health insurance, choose insurance premium
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Table 2.6.1: Out-of-sample Fit
Characteristics Predicted Spending Actual Spending N
College Education 239.9103 245.0986 5986
(15.0963)
Married 274.2368 267.288 24497
(5.1554)
Female 274.1153 234.8549 17394
(9.0397)
Employed 194.0749 190.5092 8572
(10.7596)
18 - 35 153.6107 191.1943 9374
(9.181)
35 - 54 270.0012 288.7687 9302
(8.5003)
54 - 64 471.3137 420.0507 2248
(39.1556)
64 - 580.0835 556.4151 2339
(54.8308)
Income - 1st Quantile 225.2543 226.2117 34447
(4.5977)
Income - 2nd Quantile 218.5689 184.5859 7982
(13.8126)
Income - 3rd Quantile 248.9544 245.827 8262
(12.836)
Income - 4th Quantile 242.6043 354.7564 8942
(14.5191)
Full Sample 225.1972 226.1494 34457
(4.5995)
Characteristics Predicted Enrollment Actual Enrollment N
College Education 0.193 0.1674 2592
(0.0104)
Married 0.1609 0.1761 12965
(0.0044)
Female 0.1649 0.1747 9117
(0.0038)
Employed 0.1492 0.1392 4707
(0.0044)
18 - 35 0.1617 0.1314 5717
(0.0083)
35 - 54 0.1417 0.1809 6346
(0.0053)
54 - 64 0.2218 0.2292 1296
(0.0131)
64 - 0.2588 0.2484 1409
(0.0105)
Income - 1st Quantile 0.1459 0.1197 3784
(0.0086)
Income - 2nd Quantile 0.1522 0.1538 4453
(0.0074)
Income - 3rd Quantile 0.1626 0.1715 4705
(0.0094)
Income - 4th Quantile 0.1862 0.1787 4527
(0.0161)
Full Sample 0.1624 0.1577 17469
(0.0045)
Note: The out of sample fit was conducted on the sample of households in 2006 that have at least 1 member
eligible for household bundling. Enrollment is only calculated on individuals who are eligible for voluntary
SHI. Also, a household might have both eligible and ineligible members.55
and whether to implement household bundling to maximize the consumer surplus.
If medical care consumption does not respond to coinsurance rates or income, it is equiv-
alent to a pure income loss. In this case, the welfare consequence of a household bundling
policy hinges only on the distribution of risk types within and across households and house-
hold risk preferences. The mechanism of how a household bundling policy can improve social
welfare is through the potential enrollment of healthier household members, which reduce
the average cost of insuring the population for the social planner and subsequently allow
premium to decrease. The reduction in premium will allow more healthier households to
enroll in insurance, and the cycle continues.
Whether a household bundling policy can attract a healthier population in the first
place, however, depends crucially on the distribution of health types in the population. The
policy works best in a scenario in which households have similar risk compositions, i.e. no
across-household adverse selection. When this is the case, the welfare loss from adverse
selection is eliminated even in the presence of within-household adverse selection, as the
social planner could offer an insurance bundle at a price that is low enough for all households
to enroll. The results from the structural model confirms that there is significant within-
household adverse selection, which is mainly caused by the heterogeneity in within-household
health types. However, across-household adverse selection also exists. Therefore, household
bundling might lead to the complete drop out of some relatively healthier households, which
might raise the average cost of the insurance pool.
When medical consumption responses to changes in the price of coinsurance rates and in-
come, as in the context of this paper, the income effect also plays a central role in determining
whether a household bundling policy improves welfare. This is due to the interdependency in
household’s willingness to pay for insurance among members. As previously mentioned, the
potential premium reduction in household bundling comes from the cost reduction of having
healthier household members buying health insurance. With the income effect, however, this
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premium reduction needs to be sufficiently large to offset the lower willingness to pay for the
insurance bundle due to the income effect.
The setting of the counterfactual exercises resembles the actual SHI program. The social
planner operates under a budget constraint but is allowed to provide a fixed subsidy for
the entire population. Consumer surplus here is measured as the willingness to pay for
insurance at a given contract net of the insurance premium. The insurance cost-sharing
policy is fixed at the observed 2012 policy, which features 0% coinsurance rate for expense
below 100 KVND, and 20% for higher expenses. Similar to what have been implemented in
practice, the set of potential prices considered here is indexed to the minimum wage (MW),
which varies across geographical area, and the social planner does not price discriminate
based on other individual or household demographics. I also limit all potential prices per
member to be under 6% of MW, aligned with the Health Insurance Law of 1998. This
restriction also significantly reduces the choice space of prices. The counterfactual analysis
is done on the sample of households in the year of 2012.
In the first exercise, I consider a uniform pricing policy in which all potential enrollees
pay the same per-member premium. I then extend the analysis to the case in which the
government could choose nonlinear prices based on the bundle size for both individual pur-
chase and household bundling. This second exercise serves two purposes. First, similar
nonlinear prices were implemented in Vietnam in the period of the data sample. Second, it
helps to disentangle the impact of the income effect on the relative performance of household
bundling and individual purchase. The third counterfactual exercise discusses how house-
hold bundling could sustain the insurance market when premium subsidy under individual
purchase is unable to keep the market from complete unraveling.
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2.6.1 Household Bundling under Uniform Pricing
I first simulate the market outcome under the optimal household bundling policy and indi-
vidual purchase policy assuming that the social planner’s subsidy for the entire insurance
pool is the same as the subsidy observed in the data. Under individual purchase, the gov-
ernment chooses a single price for all potential enrollees. Under household bundling, the
government chooses a single price per member for all households. Table (2.6.2) illustrates
the set of insurance bundles Kh available to a household of size 2 under each policy.




Individual Purchase Household Bundling
(Uniform Pricing at 4% MW) (Uniform Pricing at 3% MW)
(1, 1) 0% 0%
(0.2, 0.2) 8% 6%
(1, 0.2) 4% N/A
(0.2, 1) 4% N/A
Note: The insurance policy in this example has a coinsurance rate of 0.2.
The effect of bundling on insurance demand and the average cost of providing insurance
is illustrated in Figure (2.6.1). At high insurance premium, limiting household choice by
implementing household bundling has a negligible impact on the demand for insurance, but
it significantly changes the composition of the insurance pool as shown by the difference in
the average costs. Using household bundling in the presence of within-household adverse
selection induces healthier members of some households to enroll but force out some sicker
members of otherwise healthy households. When the premium is low, the number of newly
added members under household bundling increases while the number of households choosing
to drop out diminishes. This occurs until the premium is sufficiently low and all households
are fully covered under both policies.
Table (2.6.3) compares the characteristics of the insured under household bundling and
individual purchase under a 4.5% MW uniform premium. Individuals who have insurance
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Figure 2.6.1: The Demand of Insurance (a) and the Average Cost of Insurance (b)





































Policy Type Bundling Individual
under both household bundling and individual purchase have worse health types and more
likely to be older. They also belong to households with higher income. The difference in the
health types of individuals who only enroll under household bundling and individuals who
only enroll under individual purchase explains the change in the average cost of providing
insurance as shown in Figure (2.6.1). Individuals who only enroll under household bundling
are on average younger and have better health types than individuals who only enroll under
individual purchase.
Table (2.6.4) summarizes the average enrollment and consumer surplus attained under
the optimal uniform prices. Under household bundling, insurance enrollment is estimated
to be 17.1 million, compared to 3.5 million under the optimal pricing under individual
purchase. Consumer surplus also increases by more than half, from 0.18% to 0.28% of total
GDP under household bundling. These significant improvement comes from the reduction
in the premium of household bundling due to the change in the risk pool. To see this, note
that when household bundling and individual purchase have the same uniform premium,
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Table 2.6.3: Compositions of Members Who Are Enrolled under Individual Purchase
and Household Bundling at 4.5% MW Uniform Premium
Characteristics Only Individual Purchase Only Household Bundling Both
<18 0.042 0.141 0.027
18 - 35 0.225 0.362 0.224
35 - 54 0.376 0.341 0.379
55 - 64 0.225 0.093 0.207
>65 0.131 0.064 0.163
Health Types θ¯hj −3.027 −3.786 −2.557
Female 0.565 0.463 0.565
Household Income 1.087 1.084 1.206
Percentage 3.1% 4.0% 8.2%
consumer surplus under household bundling is weakly worse due to the restriction of choices
for households. However, household bundling induces healthier household members to enroll,
which allows premium to decrease. At this lower premium, more households could afford
insurance, and the gain in consumer surplus more than offset the loss from having fewer
bundle choices.
Table 2.6.4: Effect of the Optimal Household Bundling on Welfare and Demand
Individual Purchase Household Bundling
(Optimal Uniform Price) (Optimal Uniform Price)
Enrollment 3.5737 17.0579
(0.5532) (2.3603)
Consumer Surplus 0.1846 0.2824
(0.0104) (0.0101)
Note: Enrollment is measured in millions, and consumer surplus is measured in % of total
GDP.
2.6.2 Household Bundling under Nonlinear Pricing
One way to attract more household members to enroll in insurance under individual pur-
chase is by offering a lower premium for additional household members. Analogously, under
household bundling, the social planner could price discriminate based on household sizes.
An example of such nonlinear prices is included in Table (2.6.5). Note that these are also
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the pricing policies that have been implemented in Vietnam (Table 1.3.2).
Table 2.6.5: Example of Household Bundling and Individual Purchase under Nonlinear
Pricing
Household Size nh Insurance Bundle κh
Premium pi(κh)
Individual Purchase Household Bundling






(0.2, 0.2) 3% 3%
(0.2, 1) 2% N/A
(1, 0.2) 2% N/A
Note: The insurance policy in this example has a coinsurance rate of 0.2.
As suggested by the results of Section 2.5, households’ partial enrollment into insurance
are mainly due to two factors: (1) the effect of income on the willingness to pay for additional
insurance, and (2) within-household adverse selection. If households’ partial enrollment into
insurance is only due to the income effect, individual purchase with nonlinear pricing can
significantly increase enrollment. However, it does not eliminate within-household adverse
selection as households can still self-select into insurance. The gain from having health-
ier household members under individual purchase is now undermined by the discount in
premiums.
Table (2.6.6) presents the impact of household bundling on consumer surplus and insur-
ance enrollment compared to individual purchase under nonlinear pricing for both policies.
The table also includes the amount of consumer surplus and insurance enrollment under
the 2012 insurance contracts.20 Compared to the uniform pricing case, nonlinear pricing
increases the demand for insurance by 2.4 million under individual purchase and 2.7 million
under household bundling. The consumer surplus also increases by 0.04% and 0.03% of GDP,
respectively. The results suggest that the 2012 premiums are not optimal, but the difference
20Table (B.6.4) in the Appendix shows the optimal prices under household bundling and individual pur-
chase as well as the observed nonlinear pricing in 2012.
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in consumer surplus due to this non-optimality is insignificant. More importantly, under the
optimal nonlinear pricing, individual purchase still leads to lower insurance enrollment and
consumer surplus than household bundling. Insurance enrollment under household bundling
is 19.7 million, compared to 5.9 million under individual purchase. Household bundling also
leads to almost 50% increase in consumer surplus compared to individual purchase. These
results highlight the importance of eliminating within-household adverse selection, which
could only be done through household bundling.
Table 2.6.6: Effect of the Optimal Nonlinear Pricing on Welfare and Demand
Household Bundling Individual Purchase Current Policy
(Optimal Nonlinear Prices) (Optimal Nonlinear Prices) (Nonlinear Prices)
Enrollment 19.7265 5.9282 4.1443
(1.1911) (1.1052) (0.1438)
Consumer Surplus 0.3192 0.2139 0.1931
(0.0097) (0.0104) (0.0093)
Note: The Current Policy is the observed policy in 2012 that allows for individual purchase. Enrollment is measured in
millions, and consumer surplus is measured in % of total GDP.
2.6.3 Household Bundling and Market Unraveling
This counterfactual exercise explores the use of household bundling when the government
cannot provide adequate premium subsidy and the market unravels under individual pur-
chase. In my model, this can also be interpreted as an increase in the administrative costs
or overhead management not associated with the cost of medical care. If these costs exist,
premium (without subsidy) exceeds the market-level actuarially fair value. When such costs
increase, premiums increase as a result, leading to the drop out of healthier enrollees and
further increasing costs.
Figure (2.6.2) illustrates the effect of household bundling on consumer surplus and in-
surance enrollment at different levels of market-wide subsidy. The level of subsidy at 0
implies that the social planner prices at the market-level actuarially fair premium. At the
2012 subsidy level, the market-wide subsidy level is 0.14% GDP. My results suggest that the
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market starts to unravel under individual purchase when the level of subsidy is cut by 50%.
However, at this subsidy under household bundling, insurance enrollment is at 16.34 million,
generating 0.15% of GDP consumer surplus. Furthermore, the market can still be sustained
under household bundling even when the amount of subsidy is negative and premiums exceed
the market-level actuarially fair value for consumers.




















































































l l lHousehold Bundling Individual Purchase Mandate
Note: The vertical line represents the current level of subsidy.
This exercise has important implications for policy implementation. The results here
are contrary to what has been suggested in the literature (Somanathan et al., 2014) that
while a household bundling policy might increase enrollment, it requires a large increase in
government subsidy in order to cover the cost of insuring additional household members.
This intuition, however, does not take into account the cost saving from the participation of
healthier household members. My results suggest that household bundling can be especially
beneficial for countries with limited funding for insurance, and it could be used to accumulate
surplus in the early period of the SHI program.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the potential welfare gain from bundling insurance contracts of mem-
bers within a household to eliminate within-household adverse selection. In the context of
health insurance, a household bundling policy works by preventing households to select only
sick members to enroll into insurance. It might, however, lead to the complete drop out
of relatively healthier households, worsening the welfare loss from adverse selection across
households. Whether this trade off results in positive welfare gain depends not only on the
distribution of risk types within and across households but also on the characteristics of the
household demand for medical utilization and the household demand for health insurance.
I empirically study this issue using data from Vietnam’s SHI program. While my setting
has focused on Vietnam, Vietnam’s similarity to other developing nations suggests promising
application of the results to other developing countries that are still struggling to achieve
universal health coverage. As of 2014, Vietnam’s national health expenditure is at 7.07% of
GDP, similar to several other lower middle income nations. Vietnam’s variance of average
per-member medical out-of-pocket costs across households, which is a possible indicator of
adverse selection across households, is also comparable to other developing nations.
Motivated by the descriptive evidence of the data, I develop a structural model of in-
surance bundle choice and medical utilization that takes into account: (i) income elasticity,
(ii) own-price elasticity, and (iii) cross-member effects. Due to the income effect, households
have decreasing willingness to pay for additional member’s insurance even in the absence
of adverse selection within the household. The estimates of the health insurance choice
and medical utilization model imply that partial household enrollment is caused by both
within-household adverse selection and the substitutability of insurance due to the income
effect. I then study the impact of household bundling on the demand for insurance and the
cost of providing insurance. The results suggest that household bundling leads to a weakly
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higher demand for insurance and lower average cost of providing insurance than individual
purchase under uniform pricing. As a result, insurance enrollment and consumer surplus is
13.5 million and 0.1% of GDP higher, respectively. The same results hold when the social
planner could choose nonlinear pricing, eliminating the loss in demand due to the income
effect. Furthermore, the insurance market is less susceptible to complete unraveling under
household bundling than individual purchase.
A household bundling policy could be implemented together with other price discrim-
ination schemes to resolve adverse selection. The implementation is straightforward when
premiums are dependent on individual and household demographics. When there is a menu
of contracts, healthier individuals are no longer uninsured but are still under-insured. The
social planner could then offer a menu of bundled contracts to induce healthier household
members to choose the more socially efficient insurance contracts.
Finally, the application of household bundling is not limited to a social health insurance
program. The intuition from household bundling could be extended to other contexts in
which several risks of the same individual are separately insured. Future work could evaluate
a household bundling policy in the presence of a competitive market of health insurers. In
this case, even when unilaterally offering a household bundle is not profitable for firms,
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3.1 Introduction
This paper revisits the classic hold-up problem which arises whenever economic agents have
to make sunk investments that are ex-ante uncontractible. Hold-up risks are ubiquitous in
many economic settings. These include relationship-specific investment in partnerships, ac-
quisition of firm-specific skills by employees, provision of general training by firms, campaign
contribution in political lobbying, and quality investment by hospitals in the healthcare mar-
ket. Framing it in the context of a bilateral trade, a buyer (he) can make an investment to
increase his valuation for a good sold by a monopolist seller (she); but anticipating that the
seller will charge a higher price upon investment and expropriate all the gains, the buyer
never invests.
Some papers (e.g. Gul, 2001; Lau, 2008) have suggested that hiding the investment from
the seller could mitigate hold-up risks. The resulting asymmetric information limits the
seller’s ability to extract the investment gains, thus improving ex-ante efficiency by partially
restoring the buyer’s investment incentive. However, the asymmetric information also creates
the possibility of trade breaking down, thus resulting in ex-post inefficiency. This suggests
that a tradeoff exists between creating ex-ante investment incentive and minimizing ex-post
inefficiency, thus the optimal information control must balance the two effects.
In this paper, we study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. A
signal structure, which is publicly determined before investment, generates signals about
the buyer’s eventual valuation of the good. Our main result illustrates that the tradeoff
described above is not necessary, if there is access to a slightly richer form of information
control. Intuitively, ex-ante investment incentive is created when the seller is unaware of
the buyer’s higher valuation at least some of the time so that he can reap some investment
gain from being under-charged; this only concerns hiding information from the seller in the
“investment state”. On the other hand, ex-post inefficiency is eliminated by revealing the
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buyer’s low valuation so that the seller does not set a high price which prohibits trade; this
only concerns information about the “non-investment state” which does not affect the ex-
ante investment incentive. In turn, this separation implies that ex-post inefficiency can be
eliminated without compromising the buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive.
Our goal is to formalize this intuition which can be instructive for information design
to mitigate hold-up risks in various applied contexts. To achieve this, we will begin our
analysis with a hold-up setting with a single and deterministic investment in Section 3.3.
This simple setting, whereby the investment outcome is binary, allows for a direct and
transparent exposition but manages to illustrate the key intuitions. We then generalize the
results to allow for stochastic investment (Section 3.4) and multiple types of investment
(Section 3.5).
In the single investment setting, we first show that when the seller cannot directly ob-
serve the investment, the buyer’s investment decision must be randomized in equilibrium.
This is because if the seller anticipates that the buyer always invests, she will charge a high
price which destroys the buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive. On the other hand, the seller
will charge a low price if she anticipates that the buyer never invests; in turn, the buyer
will want to invest for his own gains. We then characterize the set of possible investment
probability and social welfare that can be sustained in equilibrium, and the signal structure
that implements it. We show that every implementable investment probability can be op-
timally (in terms of the social welfare) implemented by the same signal structure which is
unique within an appropriate class of signal structures. This optimal signal structure takes
the following form: the buyer’s low valuation generates the “low” signal all the time; whereas
his high valuation generates both “low” and “ high” signals with strictly positive probability.
The simplicity of the optimal signal structure also allows it to be replicated by practical
arrangements, thus also alleviating the usual concern in the information design literature
about how one derives the ability to commit to a signal structure.
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In Section 3.4, we discuss how the findings above remain when the buyer’s investment
stochastically (rather than deterministically) affects his valuation. The optimal signal struc-
ture under stochastic investment continues to result in zero ex-post inefficiency because it is
designed to never make any type II error. The only difference lies in the way type I errors gen-
erate ex-ante investment incentive for the buyer now, thus affecting the exact configuration
(but not the form) of the optimal signal structure.
In Section 3.5, we allow the buyer to have more than one investment choice. We show that
the separation between information that creates ex-ante investment incentive and informa-
tion that causes ex-post inefficiency remains, so ex-post inefficiency is still always zero under
the optimal signal structure. The buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive is created when the
seller is too pessimistic about the buyer’s valuation and under-charges him, whereas ex-post
inefficiency due to trade breaking down arises when the seller is too optimistic about the
buyer’s valuation and over-charges him. Pessimism is created when the information struc-
ture muddles information about the buyer’s true investment with signals that suggest lower
investments; on the other hand, optimism is created when information about the buyer’s
true investment is muddled with signals that suggest higher investments. Therefore, the
optimal information structure is designed to allow for seller pessimism but eliminates seller
optimism. Under the optimal signal structure, whenever the seller charges a price p, she is
certain that the buyer’s true valuation is at least p but is otherwise unsure about how high
above p is the valuation.
The optimal signal structure is thus determined by the pessimism required to create
the necessary investment incentive for the buyer. With only a single investment option,
pessimism can only be created by generating the “low” signal some of the time when the
buyer’s valuation is high. Suppose there is an additional investment option that leads to a
moderate valuation. Pessimism in a high-valuation state can now be created by generating
the “moderate” signal some of the time, or a combination of both the “low” and “moderate”
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signals. This makes the characterization of the optimal signal structure significantly more
difficult. To make progress, we restrict attention to a set of buyer investment strategy
denoted by Q. Intuitively, the restriction under Q puts an upper bound on the probability of
taking a particular investment relative to the probability of taking the next lower investment.
Under the single investment setting, Q corresponds to the set of all implementable investment
strategies. We characterize the optimal signal structure that implements the investment
strategies in Q and the set of social welfare achievable when there are more than one type
of investment. Using an example with two investment options, we illustrate when and why
the highest social welfare is achieved by implementing an investment strategy within Q.
3.2 Related Literature
Our paper is primarily related to the literature on the use of asymmetric information to
mitigate hold-up risks. Gibbons (1992) and Gul (2001) show that when the investment is
completely unobservable to the seller, the ex-ante efficiency and ex-post inefficiency created
from the asymmetric information exactly cancel out; thus the welfare is unchanged from the
hold-up situation. Lau (2008) shows that the two effects change at different rates when the
probability of the seller observing the investment outcome varies. Therefore, welfare can be
improved if the seller observes the investment outcome with an intermediate probability. In
addition, both Gul (2001) and Lau (2008) emphasize how welfare is always improved if the
seller can make repeated and frequent offers after rejection by the buyer.
Our setting contrasts these two papers in two main ways. First, we allow for more general
forms of information control and also illustrate that choosing or randomizing between perfect
observability and perfect unobservability is never optimal. Second, we show that conditional
on the optimal information structure, allowing for repeated offers upon rejection by the
buyer has no effect since the seller’s offer will be accepted immediately. Yet our results also
70
complement these earlier works in that it illustrates why allowing for repeated offers in their
setup always improves welfare – repeated offers eliminate ex-post inefficiency due to trade
breakdown which occurs only in the “no-investment states”, and our results indirectly point
out that allowing for renegotiation at these states has no detrimental effect on the buyer’s
ex-ante investment incentive.
Other papers that study asymmetric information in the hold-up problem include Riordan
(1990), González (2004), Hermalin and Katz (2009), Hermalin (2013), Halac (2015), and
Tan (2017). As in Gul (2001), these papers study a variety of related issues while restricting
attention to perfect observability versus perfect unobservability of the investment, but they
do not consider more general forms of information control as in here.
Our paper is also related to the information control literature – see for example Rayo and
Segal (2010), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and subse-
quent works on Bayesian persuasion. The difference is that these papers put no restriction on
the signal structure choice (at least within the class of signal structures considered), whereas
the signal structure in our setup has to also satisfy an equilibrium condition because infor-
mation control is embedded in a hold-up problem. Consequently, we cannot appeal to the
“concavification” argument (Aumann and Maschler, 1995), which is commonly used in the
Bayesian persuasion settings; and (as will be discussed) the underlying logic of the optimal
signal structure here will also be very different.
Away from pure information control, Condorelli and Szentes (2017) study information
design in bilateral trade by allowing the buyer to publicly choose the distribution of his
valuation and consider how this choice affects the buyer’s ex-ante expected information rent;
by contrast, we study the effects of the information transmission of the buyer’s realized
valuation instead. Bergemann et al. (2015) study the effects of the signal structure that
generates signals about the buyer’s valuation to the seller; and Roesler and Szentes (2017)
study the effects of the signal structure that generates signals about the buyer’s valuation
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to the buyer himself. Both of these papers do not allow the buyer to determine his own
valuation which is the focus of our paper.
3.3 Single Investment
Single type of investment is a special case of Section 3.5. However, we provide all the details
in this section independent of Section 3.5, as this special case allows for a direct exposition
while illustrating the main intuitions transparently. The omitted proofs for this section are
in Appendix C.1.
3.3.1 Model
A buyer (he) has valuation v = L for a good that a seller (she) can produce at a cost which
is normalized to zero. Before interacting with the seller, the buyer can privately increase
his valuation to v = H at a cost c. Increasing the valuation is henceforth termed as an
investment. We assume that H − L > c so that it is socially efficient to invest. But due to
incomplete contracts, the investment is not contractible.
After the investment decision is made but before trade, the seller receives a signal s
regarding v. Let the set of signals be S. For expositional clarity, we assume that S is a finite
set, although this is without loss of generality. A signal structure is defined by {S, pi} where
pi (s|v) denotes the conditional probability of s ∈ S given valuation v. This signal structure
is common knowledge to both players at the start of the game.
After observing the signal, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the buyer. If
accepted, the seller’s payoff is p while the buyer’s payoff is v− p− Ic, where I is an indicator
function that takes the value 1 if the buyer invested, and is zero otherwise; if rejected, the
seller’s payoff is 0 and the buyer’s payoff is −Ic.
Our equilibrium concept is the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Given a signal structure,
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the buyer optimally chooses to invest or not, taking into account the distribution of signals
that his investment decision will generate and his conjecture about the seller’s pricing strat-
egy after observing each signal s ∈ S. The seller, upon observing a signal s, forms a posterior
which depends on both her conjecture about the buyer’s investment strategy and the dis-
tribution of the signals under the signal structure, and then optimally sets a price based on
her posterior. The buyer then accepts if p ≤ v and rejects otherwise. In equilibrium, each
player’s conjecture about the other player’s strategy is correct. It is readily noted that the
seller will only set p = L or p = H in equilibrium.
Throughout, we let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of the buyer investing. Thus, we say
that a signal structure implements q if the buyer’s strategy of investing with probability q
can be sustained as an equilibrium under the signal structure. In addition, all payoffs will
be expected payoffs; henceforth, we drop the “expected” quantifier to ease exposition.
Proposition 1. For any signal structure, the buyer’s equilibrium payoff is always zero.
Moreover, q = 1 cannot be implemented.
Proof. Since the seller will never set p lower than L, the buyer’s payoff is zero if he does
not invest (i.e. q = 0). If q ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium, the buyer must be indifferent between
investing and not investing, which means that his payoff is also 0. Lastly, q cannot be 1 in
equilibrium. This is because if q = 1, the seller will correctly conjecture it in equilibrium
and always sets p = H, in which case the buyer will never invest in the first place.
Proposition 1 thus implies that the seller’s payoff in equilibrium is also the social welfare,
so there is no need to differentiate between the two. Henceforth, the term “optimality” will
refer to optimality of the seller’s payoff. Since q cannot be 1 in equilibrium, the first-best
optimality cannot be achieved.
73
3.3.2 Benchmarks
3.3.2.1 Fully Informative pi: the Hold-up Case.
Consider a fully informative signal structure first, which gives the classic hold-up problem:
since the seller perfectly knows v, she always sets p = v and hence, the buyer never invests
in equilibrium. The social welfare is thus L which is all given to the seller.
3.3.2.2 Fully Uninformative pi.
Consider a fully uninformative signal structure next: pi (s|v) = pi (s′|v) ∀v ∈ {L,H} , s, s′ ∈
S. The following restates the result of Gibbons (1992) and Gul (2001) that the players’
payoffs under no information are the same as in the hold-up case:2
Proposition 2. The equilibrium under the fully uninformative signal structure is unique:
the buyer invests with probability L
H
and the seller sets p = L with probability c
H−L after every
(uninformative) signal. The seller’s equilibrium payoff is L. Therefore, the players’ payoffs
are the same as in the hold-up case in expectation.
Proof. From Proposition 1, q 6= 1. Similarly, q 6= 0; if q = 0, the seller will also correctly
conjecture that in equilibrium and always sets p = L, in which case the buyer will deviate
to choosing q = 1 instead. Let ρ be the probability that the seller sets price p = L (ρ is
independent of the signal since the signal has no information). Since q ∈ (0, 1), the buyer
must be indifferent between investing and not investing, which implies that ρ (H − L)− c =
0 ⇐⇒ ρ = c
H−L ∈ (0, 1). Thus the seller is also randomizing over H and L in equilibrium,
which implies that she must be indifferent between the two prices: L = qH ⇐⇒ q = L
H
.
The seller’s ignorance about the buyer’s investment limits her ability to expropriate
the gains from investment, thus improving ex-ante efficiency by (partially) restoring the
2See problem 2.23 in Gibbons (1992), and Proposition 1 in Gul (2001).
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buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive. As a result, the buyer invests with positive probability.
However, the asymmetric information at the trading stage creates ex-post inefficiency because
trade breaks down when the buyer did not invest but the seller sets p = H. These two effects
exactly cancel each other out in equilibrium.
3.3.3 Optimal Signal Structure
We first fix a q ∈ (0, 1) and solve for the signal structure that gives the highest seller payoff
while implementing q, assuming that such a signal structure exists. The subsequent variables
will be dependent on q, but we omit the argument throughout to ease notation. Let βs be
the seller’s posterior belief that v = H after observing signal s under signal structure {S, pi}.
With q correctly conjectured by the seller in equilibrium,
βs = Pr (v = H|s) = pi (s|H) q
pi (s|H) q + pi (s|L) (1− q) . (3.1)
Conditional on belief β, the seller’s payoff from setting p = H is βH, and that from p = L is
L. Denote xs := qpi (s|H)+(1− q) pi (s|L) as the ex-ante probability of signal s realizing. We
say that a signal structure {S, pi} is direct if S = {l, n, h} and pi has the following properties:3
if xl > 0, then βl ≤ LH ;
if xn > 0, then βn = LH ;
if xh > 0, then βh ≥ LH .
(3.2)
Lemma 1. Suppose a signal structure {pi, S} implements q and the seller’s payoff in the
equilibrium is V . There exists a direct signal structure that also implements q and the
3Note that βs is undefined when xs = 0. For completeness, we specify the convention that βl = 0 when
xl = 0, βn = LH when xn = 0, and βh = 1 when xh = 0. These beliefs form the seller’s off-equilibrium beliefs
when there is a detectable deviation from q by the buyer.
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seller’s payoff in the equilibrium is also V .
Lemma 1 implies that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct signal
structures, which we will henceforth do so. The intuition behind is similar to the revelation
principle. For any signal structure, the seller sets the same price whenever her posterior is
less (resp. more) than L
H
, so all signals that generate posteriors that are less (resp. more)
than L
H
can be grouped together accordingly.4
We follow Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and frame the problem as choosing a distri-
bution of posteriors {xs, βs}∑
s
xs=1 that has to satisfy the Bayes plausibility constraint:
∑
s∈{l,n,h}
xsβs = q. (3.3)
The original signal structure can then be backed out via pi (s|H) = βsxs
q
and pi (s|L) =
(1−βs)xs
1−q . In addition, the signal structure must satisfy the equilibrium condition:
[
pi (l|H) + σpi (n|H)
]
(H − L)− c = 0, (3.4)
whereby σ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the seller sets p = L after observing s = n. The
left hand side of (3.4) is the buyer’s payoff from investing. For him to be indifferent between
investing and not investing (so that q ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium), this payoff must be the same
as his payoff from not investing, which is 0. Using (3.1), condition (3.4) is equivalent to:






4Unlike the Bayesian persuasion literature, restricting the signal space to be the state space here is
not without loss (at least at this stage). In the persuasion literature, the papers typically assume that
the Receiver has a unique optimal action under each belief, or that the Receiver always takes the Sender-
preferred action when the Receiver is indifferent. In this paper, however, it is not a priori clear what is a
“Sender-preferred action” at a belief whereby the seller is indifferent between setting either price. This is
because the seller’s randomization strategy can disrupt the equilibrium and thus have implication on her
ex-ante expected payoff.
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Therefore, a signal structure is a direct signal structure that implements q and σ if the re-
sulting distribution of posteriors {xs, βs}∑
s
xs=1 satisfies (3.2), (3.3) and (3.5). The resulting
seller payoff is:
(xl + xn)L+ xhβhH = L+ xh (βhH − L) (3.6)
Lemma 2. Suppose there exists a direct signal structure with xn > 0 that implements q and
σ < 1, and the seller’s payoff in the equilibrium is V . There exists a direct signal structure
that implements q and σ = 1, and the seller’s payoff in the equilibrium is strictly higher than
V .
Proof. Suppose a distribution of posteriors {xs, βs} supports an equilibrium with q and σ < 1.










βl, β′n = βn, β′h = βh. It is readily verified that
{x′s, β′s} satisfies (3.2) (3.3) and (3.5). Since x′h > xh and β′h = βh, from (3.6), the seller’s
payoff under {x′s, β′s} is higher.
Intuitively, at the interim stage (after the signal realization but before trade), the seller’s
(interim) payoff under each signal can be ranked: signal l gives payoff L; signal n gives payoff
L regardless of the seller setting p = L or p = H; and signal h gives a payoff that is higher
than L. Thus, if there is a probability of 1 − σ > 0 that she will set p = H after seeing
signal n, this probability can be appropriately shifted to increase the ex-ante likelihood of
signal h being realized which gives the seller a higher payoff. Doing so would not affect the
equilibrium condition (3.5) since the probability of the seller offering p = L after the buyer
has invested will not be altered.
Lemma 2 implies that when searching for the signal structure that maximizes the seller’s
payoff, we can restrict attention to equilibria with σ = 1. In turn, signals l and n are
essentially equivalent and can hence be pooled together. Thus we can restrict attention





, and the seller plays p = L at s = l and p = H at s = h.5 The following theorem
gives the main result of this section:
Theorem 1. A signal structure that implements q exists if and only if q ≤ L
L+c . For any
q ≤ L
L+c , the signal structure that maximizes the seller’s payoff while implementing q is
unique within the set of direct signal structures. It consists of:
pi (l|L) pi (h|L)










. Trade always takes place,
and the seller’s payoff is L+ q (H − L− c).
We emphasize that the equilibrium existence condition in Theorem 1 takes into account
all possible signal structures, not just direct signal structures. This thus provides an upper
bound on the possible investment frequency in equilibrium. Moreover, the optimal signal
structure is independent of q (although the posteriors generated and the resulting payoffs
are dependent on q). This means that the direct signal structure that optimally implements
q is the same for all implementable q.
Although this signal structure is reminiscent of the optimal signal structure in the leading
“prosecutor” example in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (hereafter KG) – in the sense that
one state is always revealed (the “L” state here and the “guilty” state in KG) – the reasonings
behind the two signal structures are very different. In particular, since the seller’s payoff is
convex in her belief here,6 the optimal signal structure in the KG world would have been the
5To see this formally, suppose an direct signal structure {xs, βs} implements q = 1 and σ = 1. Consider
another direct signal structure {x′s, β′s} such that x′l = xl + xn, β′l = xlβl+xnβnxl+xn ; x′n = 0, β′n = βn; and
x′h = xh and β′h = βh. It is readily verified that {x′s, β′s} also satisfies (3.2), (3.3) and (3.5) and gives the
same payoff to the seller as {x′s, β′s}. Since x′n = 0, signal n is irrelevant.
6At belief β ≤ LH , the seller’s payoff is L; at belief β ≥ LH , her payoff is βH.
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fully informative one, but this would bring back the hold-up problem here. More generally,
in Bayesian persuasion, when the fully informative signal structure is not optimal but there
is scope for persuasion, the optimal signal structure optimally pools “favorable” states with
“unfavorable” states while maintaining the credibility of the signals. In contrast, the optimal
signal structure here determines the conditional probabilities at each state separately.
More precisely, the buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive is provided via a probability of
c
H−L that his investment is not detected by the seller, in which case, he gets to keep the
investment gains. This probability is set so that he is ex-ante indifferent between investing
or not, which effectively pins down pi (·|H). As for pi (·|L), since pi (h|L) is the conditional
probability of having ex-post inefficiency due to trade not taking place when the buyer did
not invest and pi (·|L) also does not affect the buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive, pi (h|L)
is set to zero to eliminate all ex-post inefficiency. The result that ex-ante investment incen-
tive and ex-post inefficiency are taken care of separately by pi (·|H) and pi (·|L) respectively
thus implies that there is no tradeoff between increasing ex-ante investment incentive and
eliminating ex-post inefficiency.
Corollary 1. For any implementable q, there is zero ex-post inefficiency under the optimal







Given a fixed q, a signal structure here can be also viewed as a hypothesis test for the
investment. The “false positive” type I error of the test is (1− q) pi (h|L), which is the ex-
ante probability of detecting an investment when there is not; while the “false negative” type
II error is qpi (l|H), which is the ex-ante probability of failing to detect the investment when
there is one. When the test makes a type I error, the seller sets the high price which will
be rejected by the buyer whose valuation remains low; thus ex-post efficiency arises. On the
other hand, when the test makes a type II error, the seller sets the low price which leaves
some surplus for the buyer whose valuation is high; the potential for this then feeds back as
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the buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive. Therefore, under the optimal signal structure, the
test never makes any type I error but allows for some type II error. However, to maintain
the accuracy of the test to the seller, there cannot be too much type II error, which in turn
creates an upper bound on the implementable q. Intuitively, when q increases, the need
to maintain the credibility of signal l implies that signal l needs to detect state L more
accurately and makes less mistake via wrongly detecting state H. However, this mistake
(i.e. the type II error) is what creates ex-ante investment incentive for the buyer, so the
need to improve the accuracy of l due to a higher q in turn destroys the buyer’s ex-ante
incentive to invest at all.
Finally, the simplicity of the optimal signal structure implies that it can be replicated by
practical arrangements in many hold-up situations. The requirement is simply a technology
that imperfectly searches for hard evidence of the presence of the investment. For example,
in a vertical relationship in which the upstream supplier can make a cost-saving investment,
this “technology” can be the random inspection of the supplier’s facilities or the delegation
of this inspection to a monitor who shirks occasionally.
3.4 Stochastic Investment
We have thus far only considered investment that is deterministic. In this section, we show
that our results readily extend to stochastic investment. Suppose that instead of a binary
investment decision, the buyer now gets to choose an investment level ρ ∈ [0, 1] at a cost φ (ρ),
whereby ρ is the probability that his valuation increases from L to H. We make standard
assumptions on the cost function: φ (·) is strictly increasing and convex, with φ′ (0) = 0 and
limq→1 φ′ (q) =∞.
Let f (ρ) := ρ [L+ φ′ (ρ)]− L; it is readily verified that there exists unique ρ∗ such that
f (ρ∗) = 0.
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Proposition 3. When investment is stochastic, a signal structure that implements invest-
ment ρ exists if and only if ρ ≤ ρ∗. For any ρ ≤ ρ∗, the signal structure that maximizes the
social welfare while implementing ρ is unique within the set of direct signal structures. It
consists of: pi (l|L) pi (h|L)
















. Trade always takes place,
and the set of social welfare that is achievable in equilibrium is [L,L+ ρ∗ (H − L)− φ (ρ∗)].
We only provide the arguments behind Proposition 3; the formal proof is omitted since
it is mostly retracing the steps to arrive at Theorem 1, with a minor modification which we
explain now.





(H − L) − φ (ρ). His optimal investment level is thus determined by the first
order condition: [
pi (l|H) + σpi (n|H)
]
(H − L)− φ′ (ρ) = 0. (3.7)
This first order condition (3.7) then replaces the equilibrium condition in (3.4). By replacing
“q” with “ρ” and “c” with “φ′ (ρ)”, the analysis in Section 3.3.3 follows through with a few
cautions and qualifications about the interpretations.
First, the analysis in Section 3.3.3 only holds under the assumption that c < H−L, hence
ρ must satisfy φ′ (ρ) < H − L; but this is not a problem because pi (l|H) + σpi (n|H) < 1
(if not, the seller will never set p = H), so condition (3.7) implies that any implementable
ρ must satisfy φ′ (ρ) < H − L. Second, the buyer’s payoff is no longer always zero under
stochastic investment, so the objective in (3.6) is now the social welfare rather than just the
seller’s payoff. Third, the upper bound on the implementable investment ρ∗ is “analogous” to
the upper bound on the probability of investment q = L
L+c in Theorem 1; it is readily verified
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that ρ∗ = L
L+φ′(ρ∗) , and ρ ≤ LL+φ′(ρ∗) if and only if ρ ≤ ρ∗.7 Fourth, the social welfare under
an implementable investment level ρ is L+ ρ (H − L)− φ (ρ), and it is strictly increasing in
ρ because, as observed above, any implementable ρ must satisfy H − L > φ′ (ρ); this thus
gives an analogous set of implementable social welfare (c.f. Corollary 1).
We note that if the signals reveal information on ρ rather than on the outcome,8 then
even the fully informative signal structure will result in some ex-post inefficiency. Thus, the
elimination of ex-post inefficiency hinges on the assumption that the information structure
generates signals about the investment outcome.
3.5 Multiple Types of Investment
This section considers the hold-up setting with multiple types of investment. The omitted
proofs and details for this section are in Appendix C.2.
3.5.1 Model
Returning to deterministic investment as in Section 3.3, we suppose now that the buyer has
m + 1 possible investment actions. Investment action i ∈ M := {0, 1, . . . ,m} results in a
valuation of vi and incurs a cost of ci for the buyer. Without loss of generality, we assume
that v0 < v1 < · · · < vm; c0 = 0; and ci > 0 for any i ≥ 1. Thus i = 0 corresponds to no
investment, and m = 1 is the case considered in Section 3.3. Note that at this point, we do
not require ci to be increasing in i nor that m is the first best investment action.
As previously, an ex-ante determined signal structure generates signals about the buyer’s
valuation before the seller makes her price offer. The signal structure consists of {S, pi}
whereby S is the signal space and pi (s|vi) is the conditional probability of signal s ∈ S
7This comes from noting that ρ ≤ LL+φ′(ρ) if and only if f (ρ) ≤ 0, and f is strictly increasing.
8This is the setting consider in Hermalin and Katz (2009).
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after the buyer has chosen investment action i. The buyer’s investment strategy now is a
probability vector ~q = (q0, q1, . . . , qm) whereby qi is the probability that the buyer chooses
investment action i. His strategy is mixed if qi < 1 ∀i. In equilibrium, ~q is correctly
conjectured by the seller. It is readily noted that the seller will choose a price from only the
set of possible ex-post valuations {v0, v1, . . . , vm}, and she will never offer a price vi if she
believes that v = vi with zero probability.
The following two statements are the analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 when there are
multiple types of investment:
Proposition 4. .
1. In any equilibrium, the buyer’s investment strategy involves q0 > 0, and his payoff is
zero.
2. Under the fully uninformative signal structure, the seller’s equilibrium payoff is v0.
Therefore the players’ payoffs are the same as in the hold-up case in expectation.
Proposition 4.1 states that the buyer chooses not to invest with strictly positive probabil-
ity in equilibrium. This is because the seller will correctly conjecture the lowest investment
that is played with positive probability by the buyer in equilibrium, hence she will never
charge a price below that resulting valuation. This implies that the buyer will get a negative
payoff unless the lowest investment played is of zero cost, which is only possible if it is the
no-investment action. In turn, since the buyer must be indifferent among any action played
with positive probability and the no-investment action gives him a zero payoff, the buyer’s
payoff in equilibrium is zero. As in the single investment setting, the seller’s payoff is the
social welfare, so there is no need to differentiate between the two.
If the buyer’s investment is perfectly observed by the seller, the hold-up problem arises:
the only equilibrium outcome is the buyer chooses not to invest and is charged the price
v0. The social welfare with hold-up is v0 which is all extracted by the seller. Proposition
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4.2 generalizes Proposition 2: even when there are multiple types of investment, the fully
uninformative signal structure still does not improve welfare relative to the hold-up result
as just discussed.
3.5.2 Optimal Signal Structure
We consider the optimal signal structure next. As in Section 3.3.3, we proceed by first fixing
a buyer strategy ~q under the assumption that it is implementable, and then we consider the
optimal signal structure that implements it. It remains without loss of generality to restrict
attention to direct signal structures which we describe next. This claim requires a more
general argument than the one used in Lemma 2, but the intuition is similar, so we relegate
the details for this claim to Appendix C.2.
The seller’s posterior belief after observing signal s is a probability vector ~βs = {β0s , β1s , . . . , βms },












ipi (s|vi) be the ex-ante probability of signal s being realized.
A direct signal structure consists of a signal space S = M and a set of conditional
probabilities pi which results in posteriors that satisfy the following condition:







i ∀i 6= s. (3.9)
The term ∑j≥i βjs in (3.9) is Pr [v ≥ vi|s], which is the seller’s subjective probability upon
observing signal s that the buyer will accept price vi; thus ∑j≥i βjsvi is her interim payoff
from offering price vi after signal s. Condition (3.9) thus implies that the direct signal
structure provides signals that give incentive compatible price offer recommendations to the
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seller – the seller sets p = vs upon receiving signal s.
Next, analogous to condition (3.5), a signal structure must satisfy an equilibrium condi-
tion. In particular, a direct signal structure {M,pi} implements ~q if:









− ci = 0. (3.10)
Condition (3.10) is the buyer’s incentive compatibility condition – his payoff from playing
any investment action i in which qi > 0 must be zero (Proposition 4.1).
Under a direct signal structure {M,pi} and buyer strategy ~q, the seller’s payoff is the
ex-ante expected social welfare. Since ∑mj≤i pi (j|vi) is the conditional probability of trade









) (vi − ci) . (3.11)
We say that a signal structure pi achieves a seller payoff W if pi can implement a buyer
investment strategy ~q such that the seller’s payoff under ~q and pi is W .
Theorem 2. .
1. Suppose that ~q is implementable and the direct signal structure {M,pi} optimally im-
plements ~q. It holds that for all i such that qi > 0, pi (j|vi) = 0 for all j > i; and the
seller’s payoff is ∑mi=0 qi (vi − ci).
2. The set of achievable seller payoff is a closed interval [vo,W ∗]. Moreover, if a signal
structure pi∗ can achieve W ∗, then pi∗ can also achieve any W ∈ [v0,W ∗].
Corollary 2. By Theorem 2.1, under the optimal signal structure, the posterior satisfies
Pr (v ≤ vs|s) = 1 for any s ∈M such that xs > 0. Therefore trade always takes place.
Theorem 2.1 provides a partial characterization of the optimal signal structure. To
understand it, consider the unconditional probabilities of the outcomes. Denoting pi (j|vi)
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Figure 3.5.1: Unconditional probabilities of the three types of outcomes. Ex-ante
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
by piij (to simplify notation), Figure 3.5.1 shows a probability matrix whereby entry qipiij
is the unconditional probability of the “outcome” in which the buyer had taken investment
action i and signal j is realized. The set of outcomes can be categorized into three types:
the “boxed outcomes”, the “underlined outcomes” and the “diagonal outcomes”. The boxed
outcomes are in the upper triangular section of the matrix whereby the probabilities of
their occurrences are boxed; in these outcomes, the seller is overly optimistic about the
buyer’s valuation and hence charges too high a price which then results in trade breakdown
and thus ex-post inefficiency. On the other hand, the underlined outcomes are in the lower
triangular section of the matrix whereby the probabilities of their occurrences are underlined;
in these outcomes, the seller is too pessimistic about the buyer’s valuation and hence under-
charges him which then allows the buyer to keep some of the investment gain. Finally, the
diagonal outcomes are the diagonals of the matrix; in these outcomes, the seller has the
exact judgement of the buyer’s valuation and hence charges him his true valuation which
results in the seller extracting all the investment gain.
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Given ~q, the seller strictly prefers only the diagonal outcomes to occur. However, the
buyer’s ex-ante investment incentive can only come from the underlined outcomes. In partic-
ular, along each row, the underlined entries in the matrix (and only these underlined entries)
have to satisfy the buyer’s incentive compatibility condition in (3.10). Therefore, underlined
outcomes must occur with positive probability. The other concern is the seller’s incentive
compatibility condition in (3.9). This requires that along each column, the seller believes
that the outcome is sufficiently likely to be the diagonal outcome. Notice that moving all
the probabilities of the boxed outcomes (where ex-post inefficiency occurs) to the diagonal
outcomes actually helps to satisfy (3.9) and does not affect (3.10). This illustrates the sep-
arability between eliminating ex-post inefficiency and creating ex-ante investment incentive
for the buyer. Therefore, under the optimal signal structure, the boxed outcomes (hence
ex-post inefficiency) never occurs.
The characterization of the optimal signal structure is then completed by appropriately
choosing the occurrences of the underlined outcomes to generate the buyer’s investment
incentive to implement an investment strategy ~q. Given how these choices must interact with
the occurrences of the diagonal outcomes to simultaneously satisfy both conditions (3.9) and
(3.10), this problem is significantly more difficult when there are multiple investments, and
there is not any general property that one can exploit.
To make progress, we henceforth assume that vi− vi−1 ≥ ci for all i ≥ 1, and we restrict
attention to the set of buyer investment strategy Q, defined as the following:




q1 and qi ≥ (v
i − vi−1) ci+1
(vi − vi−1 − ci) vi q
i+1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1} . (3.12)
Q is a set of investment strategy whereby the probability of taking any investment action
is bounded above relative to the probability of the next lower investment action. Recall
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that the seller’s incentive compatibility condition in (3.9) requires that along each column
in Figure 3.5.1, the diagonal outcome is sufficiently likely to occur relative to the underlined
outcomes. Intuitively, the investment strategies in Q would satisfy (3.9) more “easily”. Using
the results in Theorem 1, it is readily verified that Q is the full set of implementable buyer
investment strategy when m = 1.
We say that a seller payoff W is Q-achieveable if there exists a signal structure pi and a
buyer investment strategy ~q ∈ Q such that pi implements ~q and the resulting seller payoff is
W .
Proposition 5. Every ~q ∈ Q is optimally implementable by the following signal structure:
pi (0|v0) = 1 ; pi (j|v0) = 0 ∀j > 0;
∀i ≥ 1: pi (i− 1|vi) = ci
vi−vi−1 ; pi (i|vi) = 1− c
i
vi−vi−1 ; pi (j|vi) = 0 ∀j 6= i− 1, i.
(3.13)







j (vi − ci)
]








for i ≥ 1.
The signal structure in (3.13) has the simple feature that the seller’s pessimism after an
investment action i is created via only believing that it is the next lower investment action
i−1. In terms of the probability matrix in Figure 3.5.1, under this information structure, only
two outcomes arise with positive probability along each row i ≥ 1: the diagonal outcome and
the underlined outcome immediately to the left of it. Therefore, we call the signal structure
in (3.13) an adjacent type-II error signal structure (hereafter A2 signal structure). In the
proof of Proposition 5, we also show that any strategy that is implementable by the A2
signal structure must be in the set Q.
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As higher investment actions are also more efficient by assumption here,9 the optimal
investment strategy (i.e. the one that maximizes the seller’s payoff) is the one whereby all
the bounds in condition (3.12) are binding. This corresponds to an investment strategy
in which qi = αi∑m
j=0 α
j ; hence αi represents the “weight” for investment action i under the
optimal investment strategy.
The question that naturally arises next is whether if there exists any ~q /∈ Q that is
implementable and results in a higher payoff for the seller. While we deem this question
impossible to answer in general, we can consider the example of m = 2 whereby we can
analytically solve for the signal structure that achieves the highest seller payoff. We show that
for certain parameter values, the highest seller payoff is indeedQ-achieveable; in other words,
our restriction to the set Q in such instances is without loss and Proposition 5 characterizes
the optimal signal structure that implements any implementable buyer strategy. In cases
where this highest seller payoff is not Q-implementable, we use the example to illustrate why
and how better investment strategies can be implemented.
Example: m = 2.
We characterize the signal structure that implements the highest seller payoff under m = 2
now. Note that Theorem 2 together with condition (3.10) completely pin down pi (·|v0)
and pi (·|v1); and pi (·|v2) is determined by pi (0|v2) (v2 − v0) +pi (1|v2) (v2 − v1) = c2. Denote





, and let pi (1|v2) = f (γ) = c
2−γ(v2−v0)
v2−v1 . Thus, for any implementable
~q, the signal structure that implements it is parametrized by γ (which is dependent on ~q):

pi (0|v0) pi (1|v0) pi (2|v0)
pi (0|v1) pi (1|v1) pi (2|v1)








γ f (γ) 1− γ − f (γ)
 (3.14)
9vi − vi−1 ≥ ci implies that vi − ci > vi−1 − ci−1.
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Proposition 6. Let ξ = c
2(v1−v0)+v0(v2−v0)
(c1+v0)(v2−v0)−(v1−v0−c1)v1 . The signal structure that achieves the
highest seller payoff under m = 2 is uniquely the signal structure in (3.14) whereby:10
• if v2−v0−c2
v1−v0−c1 ≤ ξ, then γ = 0;
• if v2−v0−c2




v1−v0−c1 ≤ ξ, the highest achievable seller payoff is Q-achieveable.11
We provide a bit of details of the derivation to outline the intuitions of Proposition 6; the
full derivation is in the proof. Fixing a γ, the highest achievable seller payoff is the solution
to program P (γ):
W (γ) := max
q1;q2
(1− q1 − q2) v0 + q1 (v1 − c1) + q2 (v2 − c2)
subject to[
































v1 ≥ q2f (γ) v2 (3.17)
q1 + q2 ≤ 1 (3.18)
The objective follows from (3.11). Constraints (3.15) and (3.16) are conditions (3.9) for
s = 0; and (3.17) is condition (3.9) for s = 1. We shall illustrate the point by starting
at γ = 0 (i.e. the A2 signal structure) and see if the seller’s payoff can be improved by
increasing γ.
10To be precise, the uniqueness property does not apply at the knife-edge case of v2−v0−c2v1−v0−c1 = ξ. In this





11This is because the signal structure under γ = 0 is the A2 signal structure. As mentioned above, any
strategy that is implementable by the A2 signal structure must be in Q.
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v0 , which is violated if q
1 +q2 > 1;
thus (3.18) is subsumed by (3.15). Moreover, this is a linear program, so the solution lies
on a vertex. It is readily seen that constraint (3.16) is trivially satisfied at γ = 0. So the
solution is the intersection of (3.15) and (3.17) when both constraints bind. We note that
these two constraints maintain the credibility of signals s = 0 and s = 1 respectively.
Consider increasing γ slightly from 0 to ε. Since f (ε) < f (0), this relaxes constraint
(3.17) which allows us to increase q2 slightly at the expense of q1. On the other hand,
increasing ε and q2 will violate constraint (3.15); to restore it, we have to decrease q1 and
move the probability weight to q0. Denote the increase in q2 by z2; and the decrease in q1


















v1 − v0 − c1
)
.
Therefore, increasing γ from 0 to ε will not increase the seller’s payoff if:
v2 − v0 − c2




Condition (3.19) has the intuitive interpretation that the left-hand side is the ratio of the
value of investment action 2 relative to 1; while the right-hand side is the ratio of the increase
in likelihood of 2 relative to the decrease in likelihood of 1.
The changes in probabilities (i.e. values of z1 and z2) depend on ε. For small enough
ε, it remains true that the solution to program P (ε) is the intersection of the two binding
constraint (3.15) and (3.17). Thus, z1 and z2 are determined by these two conditions. Since

















where qˆ2 is the solution of q2 under γ = 0. Likewise, (3.17) must bind for both γ = 0 and
























2 (v1 − v0) + v0 (v2 − v0)
(c1 + v0) (v2 − v0)− (v1 − v0 − c1) v1 = ξ. (3.22)
Condition (3.22) provides the ratio in the changes in likelihood of investment actions 2 and
1 when increasing γ slightly from 0. Combining (3.22) with (3.19), we can conclude that
increasing γ slightly from 0 worsens the seller’s payoff when v2−v0−c2
v1−v0−c1 ≤ ξ.
This tradeoff, which compares the effects of relative likelihood of investment actions 2
and 1 (i.e. z2
z1 ) with the relative payoffs from the two actions (i.e.
v2−v0−c2
v1−v0−c1 ), determines
whether the seller’s payoff can be improved by increasing γ. For low γ in which constraints
(3.15) and (3.17) are binding – which happens when γ ≤ c1c2(v1−v0)(v2−v1+c1) – the effect of a
marginal increase in γ on the relative likelihood of investment actions (i.e. z2
z1 ) is always the
expression in (3.22). Therefore, increasing γ increases (resp. decreases) the seller’s payoff
when v2−v0−c2
v1−v0−c1 < ξ (resp.
v2−v0−c2
v1−v0−c1 > ξ).
When γ > c1c2(v1−v0)(v2−v1+c1) , constraint (3.16) becomes binding, so the effect of an increase
in γ on the relative likelihood of investment actions changes, and we can verify that it is
always lower than the relative payoffs. This implies that increasing γ beyond c1c2(v1−v0)(v2−v1+c1)
always decreases the seller’s payoff.
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3.6 Conclusion
The literature has noted that introducing information asymmetry regarding the buyer’s
investment can prevent the seller from abusing her bargaining power and hence alleviate
the hold-up risks. Implicitly suggested in these earlier papers is a tradeoff between ex-
ante investment incentive and ex-post inefficiency due to the asymmetric information. In
this paper, we make the point that such a tradeoff is unnecessary because the information
that creates ex-ante investment incentive (when hidden) is different from the information
that creates ex-post inefficiency (when hidden). Consequently, by hiding and revealing the
right information, ex-post inefficiency can be eliminated without compromising the ex-ante
investment incentive. Moreover, such forms of more efficient information control often do
not require overly complex arrangements in the economic relationship. In turn, we hope that
our results can serve as a guidance for future work on how to better make use of information
control to mitigate the hold-up problem in various applied settings.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Medical Care as a Normal Good
Table (A.1.1) summarizes the cross-sectional income elasticity of OOP costs controlling for
insurance status and observed individual characteristics. The elasticity is between 0.204 and
0.316 and is statistically significant for all enrollee types.1
Whether medical care is a normal good has important implications on welfare. Without
allowing for the positive income effect, any correlation between medical spending and income
is attributed to the difference in the underlying health types. For example, in the absence of
income effect, a positive correlation between income and medical spending implies counter-
intuitively that richer individuals are sicker. It is thus more efficient from the social planner’s
perspective to insure higher income individuals. On the other hand, if all correlation between
income and medical spending is due to the positive income elasticity, it might be socially
more efficient to insure low income individuals. This is because when facing with the same
health shock, individuals with lower income have higher marginal utility of consumption and
1The estimates for income elasticity of the demand for health expenditure vary widely in the literature
(Getzen, 2000), ranging from 0 to about 1.5. Among studies that use micro data, the estimates are between
0 to 0.7
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Table A.1.1: Cross-sectional Income Elasticity on OOP Costs by Enrollee Types


















Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation within geographical area
Note: The set of individual characteristics included in the regression is: age, educational level,
marital status, gender, and job type. The sample is restricted to individuals with positive OOP
costs only.
thus are more adversely affected by the health shock than higher income individuals.
A.2 Moral Hazard in SHI
A major empirical challenge in estimating the effect of insurance on the demand of medical
care is the endogeneity between health insurance status and unobserved health conditions.
One of the most reliable evidence on this moral hazard effect was established in Manning
et al. (1987) and more recently Finkelstein et al. (2012) in which random assignments of
insurance were given to individuals in the US. Here, I utilize a similar natural experiment
to study the effect of moral hazard in Vietnam’s SHI program.
A feature of the voluntary SHI in 2006 is the requirement that at least 10% of house-
holds in a commune need to participate in health insurance in order for voluntary SHI to
be available in that commune. In addition, household bundling was implemented in this
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Table A.2.1: Summary Statistics of the Treatment and Control Groups
Variable (Panel A) (Panel B)
Treatment Control Difference MatchedTreatment
Matched
Control Difference
Age 44.84 35.13 9.7∗∗∗ 33.03 33.71 -0.68
(16.29) (21.06) (20.27) (20.51)
Female 0.59 0.53 0.06∗∗∗ 0.51 0.53 -0.02
(0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
HH Size 4.18 4.76 −0.58∗∗∗ 4.62 4.64 -0.02
(1.5) (1.5) (1.62) (1.52)
College Degree 0.24 0.1 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14 0.14 0.01
(0.42) (0.3) (0.35) (0.34)
Log HH Income
(Per Member) 9.1 8.66 0.45
∗∗∗ 8.99 8.95 0.05∗∗
(0.65) (0.64) (0.69) (0.82)
Chronic Disease 0.16 0.1 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09 0.1 -0.01
(0.37) (0.3) (0.28) (0.3)
N 853 1787 2640 2640
period. In the data, I observe households who attempted to purchase voluntary SHI but
were ultimately denied due to the lack of participation of other households in the commune.
I then construct a treatment group of individuals who were able to obtain voluntary SHI and
a control group of individuals who were unable to obtain voluntary SHI due to the commune
requirement.
Panel A of Table (A.2.1) shows the summary statistics of the control and treatment
groups in the sample. On average, the treatment group has higher household income, older,
and more educated than the control group. Furthermore, the treatment group is more
likely to have chronic diseases. The control and treatment groups are therefore not directly
comparable. To correct for the difference in the observed characteristics of the control
and treatment groups, I construct a matched sample using nearest-neighbor matching on
propensity scores based on a logistic regression using household’s observed characteristics
and individual’s observed characteristics,2 excluding individual health indicators.
2The set of household characteristics includes the number of members needed to buy insurance, log
household income, fixed effects for geographical areas, and the average household’s education level. The
set of individual’s observed characteristics includes individual age categories, gender, marital status, and
education level.
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Panel B of Table (A.2.1) shows the summary statistics of the matched control and
matched treatment groups. After matching, the differences in demographic variables be-
tween the treatment and control groups are negligible. The difference in the probability
of having chronic diseases is also largely eliminated, thus alleviating concerns of adverse
selection that could lead to an over-estimation of the treatment effect of moral hazard.
Tables (A.2.2) reports the results of the average treatment effect in the overall sample and
by whether an individual has chronic diseases. On average, insured individuals increase out-
patient visits by 0.7 visit and in-patient visits by 0.06 visit. The treatment effect on in-patient
visits is significantly larger for people with chronic conditions, but people without chronic
conditions are more likely to increase the number of out-patient visits. The results suggest
that the increase in medical utilization due to enrollment in voluntary SHI is correlated with
the underlying health status.
Table A.2.2: Average Treatment Effect on Medical Utilization Associated with Enroll-
ment in Voluntary SHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OPV IPV OPV (chronic) IPV (chronic) OPV (non chronic) IPV (non chronic)
ATE 0.672∗∗∗ 0.0602∗ -0.447 0.253∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.0539∗
(0.199) (0.0275) (1.289) (0.0966) (0.166) (0.0269)
Observations 2640 2640 300 300 2189 2189
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Note: OPV and IPV are the number of out-patient and in-patient visits respectively.
A.3 Additional Figures
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Figure A.3.1: Kernel Density Estimate of the Age Distribution for the Voluntarily
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Figure A.3.2: Number of Households with Some Members Eligible for Non-Student
Voluntary SHI and/or Fully Covered under SHI
31078 128072767
HH w/ members eligible for (non−student) voluntary SHI
Fully Covered HH
Figure A.3.3: Number of Households With Some Non-Student Voluntary SHI Enrollees
and/or Non-Student Members Being Uninsured
28258 28592728
HH w/ uninsured (non−student) voluntary members
HH w/ (non−student) voluntary members
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Figure A.3.4: Number of Households With Some Non-Student Voluntary SHI Enrollees
and/or Student Being Uninsured
15923 38791066
HH w/ student voluntary members
HH w/ uninsured student voluntary members































Table A.4.1: Summary Statistics of Medical spending by Year, Restricted to Individuals
with Positive Medical Expenditure.
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Outpatient visits 2.885 3.201 3.252 3.301 3.153
(4.026) (4.725) (4.851) (5.032) (4.330)
Inpatient visits 0.276 0.242 0.264 0.301 0.274
(0.794) (0.665) (0.701) (0.840) (0.749)
OOP 632.2 631.4 899.5 1364.0 1741.5
(2661.5) (2433.3) (4295.4) (5147.4) (6404.7)
Medical OOP as Share of Average Income 0.126 0.102 0.0993 0.112 0.0942
(0.549) (0.484) (0.381) (0.453) (0.431)
Observations 13072 14603 13178 15061 14352
Note: The out-of-pocket cost (OOP) is measured in KVND. Average income is measured annually in KVND,
calculated as the total household income divided by the number of household members.
Table A.4.2: Effect of Having Three Members or More on Insurance Enrollment
Variable Treatment Control Difference MatchedSample
Age 40.77 44.33 3.56∗∗∗ 41.74
Male 0.47 0.44 0.02∗∗∗ 0.45
High School 0.16 0.18 0.02∗∗∗ 0.15
College 0.06 0.08 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.02 0.03 0.01
∗∗∗ 0.02
Sick(2) 0.58 0.61 0.03∗∗∗ 0.58
N 105778 32628 127132
ATE −0.03∗∗∗(0.002)
(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The exact matching criteria also include employment type and contract du-
ration (not reported). Observations are dropped when exact matches are not found
(11274 cases).
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Table A.4.3: Effect of Having Five Members or More on Insurance Enrollment
Variable Treatment Control Difference MatchedSample
Age 40.53 42.17 1.64∗∗∗ 41.44
Male 0.46 0.46 0.02 0.46
High School 0.16 0.17 0.01∗∗∗ 0.15
College 0.05 0.07 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.02 0.03 0.0
∗ 0.02
Sick(2) 0.58 0.60 0.03∗∗∗ 0.58
N 47315 91091 128693
ATE −0.03∗∗∗(0.002)
(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The exact matching criteria also include employment type and contract du-
ration (not reported). Observations are dropped when exact matches are not found
(9713 cases).
Table A.4.4: Effect of Having Six Members or More on Insurance Enrollment
Variable Treatment Control Difference MatchedSample
Age 40.04 42.01 1.97∗∗∗ 41.38
Male 0.46 0.46 0.0 0.45
High School 0.14 0.17 0.03∗∗∗ 0.14
College 0.04 0.07 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04
Disability or
Severe Disease(1) 0.02 0.03 0.01
∗∗∗ 0.01
Sick(2) 0.58 0.59 0.01∗∗∗ 0.58
N 28049 30357 123887
ATE −0.03∗∗∗(0.001)
(1)Defined as having to be taken care of by someone else.
(2)Defined as having been injured or sick within the last 12 months.
Note: The exact matching criteria also include employment type and contract du-
ration (not reported). Observations are dropped when exact matches are not found
(14519 cases).
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Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Sampling Algorithm
To prioritize speed, βs and βζ are estimated separately from the rest of the parameters. Whether an
individual is sick is observed for the entire sample, whereas the fraction of coverage is only observed
for data in 2008. I’m assuming that the distribution of coverage does not differ across years, and
will distribute any time-variant component of medical spending and/or insurance choice to a time
fixed effect in the distribution of health types θ¯. With specified priors on βs and βζ , the posteriors
are known, and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo through Stan is used to directly sample βs and βζ . The
estimates are robust to the choice of priors, whether weakly informative or uninformative, and are
similar to the MLE estimates. Throughout this section, I use Gelman and Rubin’s test (Gelman
and Rubin, 1992) to test for convergence.
The rest of the parameters are sampled using Gibbs sampling. The hyper parameters include
H = {βω, βr, βγ , βδ, βθ, sω, sr, sδ, sγ , sθ, βW , σλ, σ, α, sθ}. Conditional on these hyper-parameters,
(θ¯h, ωh, rh, δhj , γhj) can be drawn independent across households. To reduce computational speed
on the posteriors of the hyper parameters, I allow sθ to vary across households. sθ is assumed to
be lognormally distributed with a known small variance.
I begin with notation. pi(X|Y ) denotes the prior of a variable X conditional on Y , and Π(X|Y )
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denotes the posterior. Likelihood is denoted by the usual L. φ() and Φ() are the pdf and cdf
of a normal distribution respectively and, with an abuse of notation, of a multivariate normal
distribution as well. Once a sample of lower-level parameters are drawn, the posterior of the hyper
parameters are straightforward and could be drawn directly if using conjugate priors.
B.1.1 Sampling of Lower-Level Parameters
The observed data at the household level includes (1) medical spending of each member if incurs,
and (2) the household’s choice of insurance bundle. For any given household h, at a draw of
(ωh, γh, δh3) and observed disposable income Yh and κh, θh = mh when y is less than the out-of-
pocket costs, which is observed. Otherwise, θh is the solution of:
mhj = θhj + δhjθhj [y∗h − pi(ιh)− θh · κ(ιh)]ωh (1 + κ(ιhj))−γhj (B.1)
When the spot price κ(ιh) is fully observed, the Newton’s method works well in finding the unique
roots.
Π(θhj |(κ(ιh),mh), (θ¯h, sθ, ωh, γh, δh)) = φ
(
log θhj(mh, κ(ιh), ωh, γh, δh)− θ¯hj
sθ
)
Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive ∂θhj(mh, κ(ιh), ωh, γh, δh)
∂H . Some complications
arise when the actual price is not observed, and when coinsurance rate is nonlinear. For the former,
the posterior is integrated over all possible realizations of ζhj .









where F (κ(ιh)) is specified in Section 2.4. In order to estimate this integral, I use Gauss Legendre
quadrature.
When coinsurance rate is piecewise linear (for example, for compulsory enrollees in 2006 and
2008, Table (1.3.1)), bunching might occur. Figure B.1.1 illustrates the insurance contract and
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optimal medical choice for a one-member household with a compulsory enrollee in 2006-2008. In




(1− ζ + ζκ1)mi If miζ ≤ m¯




+ m¯ζ (1− ζ + ζκ1) If m¯ ≤ miζ ≤ m¯κ2−κ1κ2−κ3
(1− ζ + ζκ3)mi If miζ > m¯κ2−κ1κ2−κ3
(B.2)
Bunching occurs when the optimal medical spending under κ1 exceeds the threshold m¯, and the
individual finds it optimal to keep spending at m¯ to enjoy the lower coinsurance rate. As the health
shock increases, the disutility from underspending on medical spending outweighs the gain from
lower coinsurance rate, and he will increase his medical spending and pay at the spot coinsurance
rate κ2. There is no bunching at the second threshold between κ2 and κ3 because κ3 < κ2. The
regions in Figure B.1.1 can be derived numerically using the indirect utility function.
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The left figure illustrates the insurance contract which determines the out-of-pocket payment from medical
spending. In this example, the first coinsurance rate for spending below m¯ is κ1 = 0. For higher spending,
coinsurance is κ2 = 1 until medical expense reaches m¯κ2−κ1κ2−κ3 , where κ3 = 0.4 is the coinsurance rate for
expense exceeding the second threshold. The right figure shows the optimal medical spending choice. From
left to right: spend at κ1, bunching, spend at κ2, and spend at κ3. There is no bunching at κ2 because the
κ3 < κ2
For individuals who can choose to enroll in insurance, the observed insurance choice carries in-
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formation about their health types. In an individual framework, the posterior of θ¯hj is a truncated
distribution. In our household framework, however, the existence of income effect creates interde-
pendency between the decision to buy insurance for different members. That is, the threshold for
θ¯hj in order for j to be insured is dependent on the value of θ¯h,−j . Due to this complication, each
members’ health type is drawn conditional on other members’ health types. To save on computa-
tional time, I only impose that no single-member deviation is utility improving for the household,
that is, the household is better off not insuring another member nor not buying insurance for a
currently insured members1. Conditional on other members’ types and all other parameters, there
exists an upper bound U(θ¯hj) and a lower bound L(θ¯hj) such that L(θ¯hj) ≤ θ¯hj ≤ U(θ¯hj) in order to
ensure that the observed bundle is optimal. The lower bound is the maximum value of θ¯hj such that
the household prefers not to enroll another currently uninsured member into insurance2. Similarly,
the upper bound is the minimum value of θ¯hj such that the household prefers to buy insurance
for a currently insured member. These thresholds are computed using the bisection method. The
posterior of θ¯hj is then given by:
Π(θ¯hj |κ(ιh),mh, θ¯h,−j , rh, ωh, γh, δh,H) =

−∞ If θ¯hj < L(θ¯hj |κ(ιh), θ¯h,−j , rh, ωh, γh, δh,H)
−∞ If θ¯hj > U(θ¯hj |κ(ιh), θ¯h,−j , rh, ωh, γh, δh,H)
Π(θhj |(κ(ιh),mh), (θ¯h, sθ, ωh, γh, δh))× pi(θ¯hj |H, θ¯h,−j)
If otherwise
where pi(θ¯hj |H, θ¯h,−j) is the conditional distribution of a multivariate normal distribution.
For (rh, ωh, γh, δh), the constraints that the household should not have any utility-improving
one-member deviation is checked directly within each drawn conditional on draws of health types.
1For a household of size nh, single-member deviation generates only nh constraints, whereas full opti-
mality requires the bundle to satisfy 2nh constraints. In assessing the model fit as well as the out-of-sample
validity test, the full set of constraints were checked
2As mentioned in Section 2.3, the household is more likely to buy insurance for a member if other
members are sicker.
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When the constraint is satisfied, the posterior of rh, ωh, γh, δh is given by:
Π(rh, ωh, γh, δh|ιh, θ¯hj ,H) = Π(θhj |(κ(ιh),mh), (θ¯h, sθ, ωh, γh, δh))×
pi(rh|H)× pi(ωh|H)× pi(γh|H)× pi(δh|H)
B.1.2 Sampling of Hyper-Parameters
Due to the large sample size, I use conjugate priors with large variance to reduce computational
time for sampling of the upper level parameters. Except for βθ, σλ, σe, and βW , all other hyper-
parameters could be drawn directly from the posteriors, which are usually a normal distribution or
an inverse gamma distribution.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We first identify the distribution of ωh using the sample of individuals with free insurance whose
household members do not incur any medical spending. Equation 2.1 for this subgroup then
becomes:
mhj = θhj + θhjδhjY ωhh
Let t be an integer, consider:
E(mthj |Yh = 1) = EθthjE(1 + δhj)t
Since the distribution of θhj is identified directly from individuals with Yh ≤ 0, the distribution of
1 + δhj and hence δhj is then identified. As has been mentioned before, Yh is disposable income
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and there is a positive probability of Yh being negative.
∫
supp(Yh)




























Eθhj ,δhj (θhj + θhj exp(s))s−t+1ds
)
E(ωth)
where the second to last equality follows a change of variable s = ω log Yh and supp(Yh) =
supp(Y ωhh ). Since both the left hand-side and the first parenthesis in the last equation can be
estimated from data, all moments of ωh are identified, and hence the distribution of ωh is identi-
fied.
We could now identify γhj from data on all individuals with exogenous insurance status using the
same approach. Let G(κh) =
∫
supp(Yh) Eθhj ,ωh,δhjθhjδhj(Yh −
∑Nh
i=1 θhiκhi)ωh . Since we are able to





































All moments of −γhj is identified, hence the distribution of γhj is also identified.
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B.3 Check that Equation 2.1 satisfies the integrability
theorem
Theorem 1 (Hurwicz - Uzawa Integrability Theorem). Let ζ :: Rn++ × R+ → Rn+. Assume
1. The budget exhaustion condition
p · ζ(p, y) = y
is satisfied for every (p, y) ∈ Rn++ × R+
2. Each component function ζi is differentiable everywhere on Rn++ × R+
3. The Slutsky matrix is symmetric, that is, for every (p, y) ∈ Rn++ × R+
σi,j(p, y) = σj,i(p, y)













σi,j(p, y)vivj ≤ 0
5. The function ζ satisfies the following boundedness condition on the partial derivative with
respect to income. For every 0 ≤ a ≤ a¯ ∈ Rn++, there exists a (finite) real number Ma,a¯ such
that for all m ≥ 0
a ≤ p ≤ a¯⇒ ∣∣∂ζi(p, y)
∂y
∣∣ ≤Ma,a¯, i = 1, . . . , n
Let X denote the range of ζ,
X = {ζ(p, y) ∈ Rn+ : (p, y) ∈ Rn++ × R+}
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Then there exists a utility function u : X → R on the range X such that for each (p, y) ∈ Rn++×R+.
ζ(p, y) is the unique maximizer of u over the budget set {x ∈ X : p · x ≤ y}
In Equation 2.1, the price of the consumption good has been normalized to 1. The full system
with a flexible price for the consumption good pc is given by:









ωh (1 + κhj
pc
)−γhj










The full demand system thus satisfies condition 1 of the integrability theorem by construction.
It also satisfies condition 2, 3 (with some tedious algebra), and 5. As for condition 4, a sufficient
condition for a n×n matrix to be negative semidefinite is that the determinant of all of its principal
minors of order k where 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 has the same sign as (−1)k, and the determinant of the
matrix is 0. It could be checked that the determinant of the Slutsky matrix is indeed 0, and the








< 1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , nh (B.3)
Intuitively, the constraint ensures that the non-negativity constraint on the consumption good
is not binding, and the demand is downward sloping.
Indifference curve and indirect utility Given Equation (B.3) is satisfied, the indifference
curve and indirect utility could be derived.
The expenditure function could be derived from the ordinary differential equation ∂eh(κh,u0)∂κhj =
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 11−ω + nh∑
j=1
θhjκhj
where v0 is a constant that satisfies the initial condition:
eh(0, u0) = Yh



















The upper contour (at-least-as-good) set that defines the set of all consumption basket (mh, ch)
that yields utility weakly greater than u0 is given by:
Vu0 = {(mh, ch) :
nh∑
j=1
mhjκhj + ch ≥ eh(κh, u0) ∀κh}
Figure (B.3.1) shows an example of the indifference curves for nh = 1 and γh1 = 0.6, ωh = 0.1
and δh1 = 1. In order to label the indifference curve, I define utility as a CRRA transformation of





∣∣∣κh = 0 (B.5)
The form of Equation (B.5) is convenient since it allows me to obtain the indirect utility function.
To see why, note that when κh = 0 and pc normalized to 1, the amount of consumption is also
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equal to the expenditure function. Given an income level Yh and price κh:




δhjθhj(κhj + 1)1−γhj − 1
1− γhj












δhjθhj(κhj + 1)1−γhj − 1
1− γhj (B.6)
Equation (B.6) is an indirect utility function that is consistent with the demand specifications (2.1).
Furthermore, any monotonically increasing transformation of (B.6) would also be consistent with
the demand specifications.
Figure (B.3.1) and (B.3.1) illustrate the indifference curves and the isoquants of the health
production function at specific parameter values when the household only has one member with
sufficient income. The indifference curves show that both medical utilization and the consumption
good exhibits decreasing marginal utility. The health production function in figure (B.3.1) shows
that medical care has greater marginal impact on health when sickness is less severe, i.e. with
worse health shock.
Figure B.3.1: Example of Indifference Curves and Isoquants
Example of the indifference curves for different
levels of utility for a single-member household.
The preference parameters are set at γ = 0.6,
ω = 0.1, δ = 1. The health shock is θ = 0.1
Example of the isoquants of the health produc-
tion function at different level of health for a
single-member household. The preference pa-
rameters are set at γ = 0.6, ω = 0.1, and δ = 1.
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B.4 Identification with ideal data
With the ideal data, each household is observed for multiple periods and faces a menu of insurance
coverage each period. There are exogenous changes in the menu’s premium, which is necessary
to generate variance in the coinsurance rate of each member once the insurance bundle is chosen.
Identification is obtained separately for each household, hence the subscript for household h is
omitted for notational convenience. The distribution of health shocks, and hence the household’s
belief, is invariant across time. I first show how identification for the demand of medical care is
achieved. The demand for medical care is given by the following system:
M1 = m1(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, Y, κ1, κ2, . . . , κn|Y > Y¯ ) (B.7)
M2 = m2(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, Y, κ1, κ2, . . . , κn|Y > Y¯ )
· · ·
Mn = mn(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, Y, κ1, κ2, . . . , κn|Y > Y¯ )
and
Mi = θi if Y ≤ Y¯ (B.8)
where (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn) is a vector of observed medical care consumption for all members, (κ1, κ2, . . . , κn)
is an observed vector of coinsurance rates which are assumed to be exogenous, and (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn)
is a vector of latent health shocks. Y is the household’s total income and also exogenous; the
threshold Y¯ is also known. Our object of interests include the unknown functions mi(·) and the
distribution of the latent health shocks Fθ . Fθ does not have any zero mass.
Assumption 2. m(·) is a continuous, differentiable, and ∂mi(·)
∂θi
> 0∀i. There exists a function
v(·) such that θ = v(M,Y,κ). Also, ∀i, mi(·|θi = 0) = 0.
Assumption 2 restricts medical care consumption of a particular member to be a strictly in-
creasing function of that member’s health shock, and medical care consumption only occurs if the
member has θj > 0. The functions m(·) need to be well-behaved such that θ is the unique solution
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of the system. When the household only has one member, without Equation B.8 (or equivalently
Y¯ = ∞), we can only identify m1 up to an increasing transformation (Matzkin, 2003). Equation
B.8 therefore serves as a normalization for mi() and directly identifies Fθ .
Without additional restriction onmi(·), system B.7 cannot be identified. Let ψ(θ−i,κ−i, Y ) be a
symmetric function in (θ,κ). That is, if (θ˜, κ˜) is a permutation of (θ,κ), then ψ(θ˜, κ˜, Y ) = ψ(θ,κ, Y ).
Also, let θi = (0, . . . , 0, θi, 0, . . . , 0), θ−i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . θn), and κ−i = (κ1, . . . , κi−1, κi+1, . . . κn).
Assumption 3. mi(θ, y,κ) = mi(θi, y − ψ(θ−i,κ−i, y),κ) .
Assumption 3 restricts the cross effect of different members’ medical care consumption to be
channeled exclusively through the income effect. Such cross-member effects are assumed to be
equivalent to an income loss of ψ(θ−i,κ−i). Furthermore, this income loss is symmetric among
household members.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 2 and 3 are satisfied, m(·) is identified.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first consider the case in which only one member of the household
receives a positive health shock, θ = θi = (0, . . . , 0, θi, 0, . . . , 0). Using the same approach as in
Matzkin (2003), mi(θi, Y, κi) is identified when F θj (θj |θ−j = 0) is known. Note that this is achieved




If there exists at least two members i, j such that θj , θi > 0:















When (θi, κi) = (t, k) ∀i, ψ(θ−i,κ−i, Y ) = ψ(θ−j ,κ−j , Y ) = ψ0(t, k, Y ) ∀i, j. Equation B.9 becomes
an ODE with the initial condition ψ0(0, k, Y ) = 0, and ψ0(t, k, Y ) is identified.
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If there exists one pair (θi, κi) = (t, k′) 6= (t, k), let ψ(θ−j ,κ−j , Y ) = ψ1(t, k, k′, Y ) for any
j 6= i. Since ψ(θ−i,κ−i) = ψ0(t, k) , equation B.9 becomes an ODE of ψ1 as a function of t. Using
the initial condition ψ1(0, k, k′, Y ) = 0, ψ1(t, k, k′) is identified. Using similar arguments, we can
identify ψn−1(t,κ−i, Y ) = ψ((t, t, . . . , t),κ−i, Y ) for an arbitrary κ.
If θj = t ∀j 6= i, and θi = t′ 6= t, let ψn−11 (t′, t,κ, Y ) = ψ(θ−j ,κ−j , Y ) ∀j 6= i. Using the fact
that ψ(θ−i,κ−i, Y ) = ψn−1(t,κ−i, Y ) has already been identified, ψn−11 (t′, ·) is the solution of the
ODE in equation B.9 with the initial condition ψn−11 (t, t,κ−j) = ψn(t,κ−j). Similar to the above
arguments, we could identify ψ() for any θ−i and κ−i.
When the menu of insurance coverage is discrete, the household’s observed choice of insurance
coverage implies an upper and lower bound on the household’s risk aversion, and the risk aversion
coefficient rh is partially identified. If the menu of insurance coverage is continuous, there is a
1-1 mapping between the household’s choice of insurance and its risk aversion conditional on the
distribution of health shocks of household members. In this case, rh is point identified.
B.5 Additional Figures
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Figure B.5.1: Distribution of the WTP for Insurance for the Second member as a
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Note: the vertical black line represents the mean of the distribution.
Figure B.5.2: Distribution of the Cost of Providing Insurance for the Second Member
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Note: the vertical black line represents the mean of the distribution.
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Figure B.5.3: Demand of Insurance (a) and Average Cost of Insurance (b) under






































Policy Type Bundling Individual
Note: In this exercise, I assume that the member with the worse health type within each household
(arg maxj θ¯h) has free SHI. Since these members are now excluded from the voluntary SHI pool, there is
less within-household adverse selection. Alternatively, one could directly change the parameters that
characterize the distribution of health types within the household (σλ, σ, βW ). However, this will change
the degree of adverse selection across households as well.
While household bundling still reduces the average cost of providing insurance, it leads to a lower demand
for insurance. Compared to the original benchmark (Figure 2.6.1), the exclusion of members with the
worse health types within each household affect households’ willingness to pay for insurance in two ways.
First, households’ willingness to pay for any bundle is now lower due to the income effect of not having to
pay for the first insurance. Second, under household bundling, households who previously buy insurance
only to keep the sickest member from being uninsured will now drop out of insurance.
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B.6 Additional Tables
Table B.6.1: Summary of Estimates of Variance of Health Types and Uncertainty of
Health Shocks
Within-HH Covariance Matrix of Within-HH’s Health Types
Head of HH Spouse Children Parents Others
Head of HH 1.0372 0.4829 0.4605 0.396 0.5154
(0.2276) (0.3711) (0.3606) (0.305) (0.4023)
Spouse 0.4829 1.5602 0.8543 0.7388 0.9628
(0.3711) (0.0272) (0.0894) (0.0683) (0.0977)
Children 0.4605 0.8543 1.4808 0.7049 0.9199
(0.3606) (0.0894) (0.067) (0.0765) (0.1187)
Parents 0.396 0.7388 0.7049 1.2756 0.7948
(0.305) (0.0683) (0.0765) (0.0817) (0.0866)
Others 0.5154 0.9628 0.9199 0.7948 1.7023




Table B.6.2: Summary of Estimates
Observed Characteristics βθ pis βω βr βγ βδ
Constant -6.5368 0.6175 -1.1041 -0.0046 -0.3488 -0.8545
(0.0341) (0.0064) (0.1994) (0.0018) (0.02) (0.112)
College 0.2781 0.0134 0.0305
(0.0291) (0.0112) (0.0108)
Married 0.0014 0.0054 0.0435
(0.0198) (0.0159) (0.0222)
Female 0.0381 0.0094 -0.0103 0.0282
(0.0228) (0.0042) (0.005) (0.0096)
Employed -0.0856 -0.0183 -0.0569
(0.0182) (0.0086) (0.021)
Age 0-18 (Dropped) (Dropped) (Dropped) (Dropped)
Age 18-35 0.2902 -0.0482 -0.0198 0.0664
(0.0258) (0.0089) (0.0152) (0.0119)
Age 35-54 0.5348 -0.1073 -0.0499 0.1022
(0.0433) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0256)
Age 54-64 0.8551 -0.1493 -0.0643 0.0877
(0.0392) (0.0213) (0.0164) (0.0225)
Age 64+ 1.0206 -0.1995 -0.0248 0.084





















Eldest member 0.1128 0.0137
(0.0175) (7e-04)
Ratio of Females -0.0275 -0.0083
(0.084) (0.0022)
Average age -0.0793 -0.0177
(0.0212) (9e-04)
Number of members 0.0592 0.0018
(0.0148) (3e-04)
Avg. Education 0.0404 -0.0083
(0.0198) (4e-04)
Agricultural HH (Dropped) (Dropped)
Formal sector HH -0.1477 0.0308
(0.0405) (0.0018)
Self employed HH 0.0266 -0.0328
(0.0315) (8e-04)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Table B.6.1 — sω sr sγ sδ
0.419 0.000 0.148 0.322
(0.074) (0.000) (0.046) 0.050
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Table B.6.3: In-sample Fit
Characteristics Predicted Spending Actual Spending N
College Education 456.0382 466.8742 26662
(21.4514)
Married 508.5571 454.8552 107872
(16.1184)
Female 509.2673 419.1365 73067
(17.4493)
Employed 362.5862 336.7943 37438
(14.1873)
18 - 35 282.4619 290.1258 39394
(13.5302)
35 - 54 479.2727 498.8892 38569
(13.7281)
54 - 64 895.247 816.9197 10669
(25.0268)
64 - 1147.2847 961.1489 9942
(79.9024)
Income - 1st Quantile 365.4047 205.1497 40700
(23.3577)
Income - 2nd Quantile 309.5344 291.1287 34818
(18.8007)
Income - 3rd Quantile 408.5393 409.975 34512
(21.4297)
Income - 4th Quantile 627.9152 660.6398 34815
(9.4608)
Full Sample 425.3257 384.087 144854
(13.8209)
Characteristics Predicted Enrollment Actual Enrollment N
College Education 0.1493 0.1408 10722
(0.0069)
Married 0.1258 0.1093 52971
(0.0058)
Female 0.1324 0.1111 35315
(0.0042)
Employed 0.1013 0.0823 19300
(0.0061)
18 - 35 0.1039 0.0652 21760
(0.0047)
35 - 54 0.126 0.1083 25005
(0.0063)
54 - 64 0.1781 0.1893 5885
(0.0086)
64 - 0.1972 0.2293 4958
(0.0086)
Income - 1st Quantile 0.0994 0.0464 14627
(0.0041)
Income - 2nd Quantile 0.1055 0.0639 18831
(0.0051)
Income - 3rd Quantile 0.1183 0.1001 18413
(0.0058)
Income - 4th Quantile 0.1515 0.172 16498
(0.0071)
Full Sample 0.1187 0.096 68369
(0.0046)
Note: The in-sample fit excludes the sample of household in 2006 that have at least 1
member eligible for household bundling. Enrollment is calculated only on individuals
who are eligible for voluntary SHI. 130
Table B.6.4: Optimal Prices under the Observed 2012 Benchmark, Household
Bundling, and Individual Purchase with Nonlinear Pricing
Bundle Size Current Policy Household Bundling Individual Purchase
1 4.5 1.65 5.15
(0.3375) (0.7091)
2 8.55 2.69 7.955
(0.2025) (1.4052)
3 12.15 3.215 9.275
(0.3317) (1.4688)
4 15.3 3.395 9.58
(0.3912) (1.4986)
5 18.45 3.575 9.885
(0.5329) (1.6757)
6 21.6 3.755 10.19
(0.7092) (1.9606)
Note: The prices are indexed to the minimum wage of 2012.
Table B.6.5: Comparison of Consumer Surplus Across Groups of Individuals With
Different Observed Characteristics.
Characteristics Current Policy Optimal Household Bundling Optimal Individual Purchase
1 Eligible Member 188.9435 291.0182 182.6037
(21.3873) (36.3367) (31.0466)
2 Eligible Members 321.3571 498.8662 316.6726
(36.8176) (31.1894) (45.2085)
3 Eligible Members 487.3417 744.411 516.7517
(65.086) (22.8783) (59.1256)
4 Eligible Members 595.2727 978.6602 673.2693
(72.7018) (123.2617) (90.87)
>4 Eligible Members 827.5155 1182.9059 927.6377
(134.4906) (144.4302) (118.797)
Income - 1st Quantile 244.3033 377.8188 254.1447
(17.6495) (18.7131) (20.1513)
Income - 2nd Quantile 249.5775 388.2009 256.0596
(16.9733) (25.8362) (25.9364)
Income - 3rd Quantile 303.6379 459.5977 308.025
(38.9381) (25.4719) (39.9501)
Income - 4th Quantile 357.7735 534.0323 373.8589
(31.3068) (39.5613) (32.8252)
Note: The first column indicates the percentage of enrollment for the 2012 policy. The second column indicates the frac-
tion of enrollment under the optimal household size pricing, and the third column reports the outcome under the optimal
bundle size pricing. The cost-sharing structures are fixed at the 2012 contracts.
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Table B.6.6: Comparison of Insurance Enrollment Across Groups of Individuals with
Different Observed Characteristics.
Characteristics Current Policy Optimal Household Bundling Optimal Individual Purchase
College Education 0.129 0.5418 0.1619
(0.0068) (0.0366) (0.0328)
Married 0.1148 0.5089 0.1444
(0.005) (0.0348) (0.0269)
Female 0.1317 0.5126 0.1596
(0.0074) (0.0341) (0.0259)
Employed 0.0621 0.4393 0.0949
(0.0034) (0.038) (0.0277)
18 - 35 0.0812 0.4886 0.1212
(0.0057) (0.0396) (0.0315)
35 - 54 0.1015 0.4863 0.1275
(0.0061) (0.0327) (0.0265)
54 - 64 0.1812 0.6123 0.2115
(0.0169) (0.0488) (0.0296)
64 - 0.2212 0.6482 0.249
(0.0126) (0.0377) (0.0388)
Income - 1st Quantile 0.1078 0.5115 0.141
(0.0043) (0.0357) (0.0293)
Income - 2nd Quantile 0.1089 0.4895 0.1345
(0.006) (0.035) (0.0295)
Income - 3rd Quantile 0.1025 0.5091 0.132
(0.0063) (0.0361) (0.0285)
Income - 4th Quantile 0.1259 0.5673 0.1725
(0.0061) (0.0349) (0.0364)
Note: The first column indicates the percentage of enrollment for the 2012 policy. The second column indicates the frac-
tion of enrollment under the optimal household size pricing, and the third column reports the outcome under the optimal
bundle size pricing. The cost-sharing structures are fixed at the 2012 contracts.
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Table B.6.7: Effect of Household Bundling, Individual Pricing, and Mandate on Con-
sumer Surplus under Different Levels of Subsidy.
Additional Subsidy Single - Individual Single - Bundling Individual Purchase Household Bundling Mandate
-0.136 % 0 0 0 0.1147 0.2856
(0) (0) (0) (0.0055) (0.0095)
-0.068 % 0 0 0 0.1248 0.2857
(0) (0) (0) (0.0058) (0.0095)
0 % 0 0 0 0.1368 0.2861
(0) (0) (0) (0.0071) (0.0094)
0.068 % 0 0 0 0.1523 0.2861
(0) (0) (0) (0.0083) (0.0094)
0.136 % 0 0.1707 0.0936 0.1707 0.2862
(0) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0094)
0.204 % 0.0448 0.1729 0.1596 0.1953 0.2867
(0.0721) (0.0104) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0096)
0.272 % 0.1764 0.1729 0.2173 0.2277 0.2868
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0076) (0.0083) (0.0094)
0.34 % 0.1764 0.1729 0.2465 0.2464 0.2868
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.013) (0.0094)
0.408 % 0.1764 0.1729 0.2599 0.2598 0.2868
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Note: The unit of consumer surplus is percent of total GDP. The consumer surplus obtained under mandate assumes the optimal (under
mandate) household size pricing. The third and fourth column assume nonlinear pricing.
Table B.6.8: Effect of Household Bundling, Individual Pricing, and Mandate on Insur-
ance Enrollment (in Millions) under Different Levels of Subsidy.
Additional Subsidy Single - Individual Single - Bundling Individual Purchase Household Bundling Mandate
-0.136 % 0 0 0 10.2357 37.9215
(0) (0) (0) (0.8197) (0)
-0.068 % 0 0 0 11.4003 37.9215
(0) (0) (0) (0.9346) (0)
0 % 0 0 0 13.6721 37.9215
(0) (0) (0) (0.6387) (0)
0.068 % 0 0 0 15.8493 37.9215
(0) (0) (0) (0.9377) (0)
0.136 % 0 19.5225 5.2505 19.5225 37.9215
(0) (1.0281) (0.8113) (1.0281) (0)
0.204 % 5.3265 19.8918 14.7208 24.3173 37.9215
(8.5773) (1.1697) (2.208) (1.4133) (0)
0.272 % 17.8581 19.8918 27.6712 31.0664 37.9215
(1.7216) (1.1697) (2.1002) (1.0219) (0)
0.34 % 17.8581 19.8918 34.9842 34.9954 37.9215
(1.7216) (1.1697) (2.5921) (2.4004) (0)
0.408 % 17.8581 19.8918 37.6333 37.6149 37.9215
(1.7216) (1.1697) (0.0314) (0.035) (0)
Note: The enrollment obtained under mandate assumes the optimal (under mandate) household size pricing. The third and fourth column
assume nonlinear pricing.
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PremiumVoluntary – PremiumCompulsory -133.8∗∗∗ -87.08∗∗∗ -88.18∗∗∗
(3.942) (3.242) (3.276)
Year FE No Yes Yes
Geography FE No Yes Yes
Age FE No No Yes
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix for Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let Sh ⊂ S be the set of signals such that the posteriors generated are strictly greater
than LH ; analogously, let Sl (resp. Sn) be the set of signals with posteriors strictly less than (resp.
equal to) LH . In addition, let σs denote the probability of the seller playing p = L after observing
signal s. In equilibrium, σs must be 1 if s ∈ Sl, and it must be 0 if s ∈ Sh, while it can be



















piad[n|H] upon observing n.
1
To check that this is an equilibrium with the buyer investing with probability q, first note that
given q, the seller’s pricing strategy is clearly a best response. For the buyer, his expected payoff
1If Sn is empty, then this is irrelevant.
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after investing is
Pr [p = L|v = H] (H − L)− c =
(
pid (l|H) + pid (n|H)σd
)








 (H − L)− c,
where the second line is the buyer’s expected payoff after investing under the original signal structure
{S, pi}. The buyer’s payoff when he does not invest is 0 under both signal structures. Since the





Thus q is the buyer’s best response as well, and hence it is an equilibrium.





pid (l|H) + pid (n|H)
)










where the RHS is seller’s expected payoff, conditional on the buyer investing, under {S, pi}. Next,






pid (l|L) + pid (n|L)
)







L+ 0 · ∑
s∈Sh
pi (s|H) ,
where RHS is seller’s expected payoff, conditional on the buyer not investing, under {S, pi}.
C.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove the “only if” direction of the existence result first. Suppose, for a contradiction,
that q > LL+c but there exists a direct signal structure that implements q. From Lemma 2, there
exists a direct signal structure that implements q. Let βl ≤ LH and βh > LH be the resulting
2Note that the seller’s conditional expected payoff under posterior LH is always L.
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posteriors. From (3.5), βl = qcxl(H−L) ; from (3.3), xl =
βh−q





















Since cH−L < 1, βl is decreasing in βh. βh ≤ 1 then implies that βl ≥
q( cH−L)
1−q(1− cH−L)
. When q > LL+c ,
βl >
L
H which contradicts βl ≤ LH . Next, for the “if” direction, it is readily verified that when
q ≤ LL+c , the signal structure in the theorem results in posteriors βh = 1 and βl ≤ LH , and it
satisfies the equilibrium condition (3.5).
For optimality, it suffices to consider the set of direct signal structures (Lemma 2). For any βh,
the corresponding βl is (C.1), and the seller’s payoff, from (3.6), is V (βh) = L + xhβhH − xhL.
From (3.3) and (3.5):















L = qβh (1− cH−L)L









. Since V (βh) is strictly increasing, the optimal
βh is 1, and βl =
q( cH−L)
1−q+q( cH−L)
. The seller’s payoff is V (1) = L+q (H − L− c). The signal structure
is then backed out via pi (s|H) = βsxsq and pi (s|L) = (1−βs)xs1−q .
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C.2 Appendix for Section 3.5
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Statement 1: First note that the buyer obtains a zero payoff by not investing (i.e. choosing
q0 = 1), so his equilibrium payoff is weakly higher than zero. Suppose for a contradiction that
qi = 1 for an i ≥ 1. Since the seller correctly conjectures the buyer’s strategy in equilibrium, she
will set p = vi which means that the buyer’s ex-ante payoff is −ci < 0 (contradiction). Thus, in
equilibrium, either q0 = 1 or the buyer’s strategy is mixed. Clearly the proposition is true if q0 = 1.
Suppose the buyer’s strategy is mixed now. Let i be the lowest investment action played with
strictly positive probability. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the buyer is indifferent between
playing any investment action i with qi > 0; thus his payoff is that of choosing investment i. Since




= 0; thus she will
never offer a price lower than vi, which in turn implies that the buyer’s payoff is no higher than
−ci. Since his payoff must be at least 0, i must be 0 which implies q0 > 0. In turn, since the seller
will never charge p < v0, the buyer’s payoff is zero.
Statement 2: If the seller offers p = v0 , her payoff is v0 since trade is guaranteed. Thus it
suffices to show that the seller’s equilibrium strategy must involve offering p = v0 with strictly
positive probability. To show this, note that if the lowest price offered by the seller in equilibrium
is some vi > v0, the buyer must be choosing investment i > 0 with strictly positive probability.
But since the price is never below vi, the buyer’s payoff from choosing investment i is −ci. Since
the buyer’s payoff in equilibrium is 0, i must be 0.
Sufficiency of Direct Signal Structures
Fix a buyer investment strategy ~q =
(
q0, q1, . . . , qm
)
which is correctly conjectured by the seller
in equilibrium. Under an arbitrary signal structure {S, pi}, the seller’s posterior upon observing








whereby βis is the probability that the
seller assigns to v = vi, and the updating formula is in (3.8) in the main text. The ex-ante
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is a probability vector and σis is the probability that the seller offers
price p = vi upon observing signal s.3
The signal structure has to satisfy equilibrium conditions whereby both players’ strategies are
best responses against each other. ~σ is a best response price strategy for the seller if:








j ∀j 6= i,
which can be equivalently written as:














vj ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i. (C.2)
For the buyer, for every investment played with strictly positive probability under ~q, his expected
payoff from it must be 0 (Proposition 4). This is equivalent to:












= ci . (C.3)
Thus, a signal structure implements ~q and ~σ if the signal structure (and its resulting posteriors)













Let ΣS be the set of pure strategies of the seller under a signal space S – that is, if ~σ ∈ ΣS ,
then for all s ∈ S, there exists i ∈M such that σis = 1.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the signal structure {S, pi} implements ~q and ~σ /∈ ΣS, and it gives the
seller a payoff of V . There exists a signal structure {M, pˆi} that implements ~q and ~ˆσ ∈ ΣM , whereby
σˆii = 1 ∀i ∈M ; and it also gives the seller a payoff of V .
3The strategy space of the seller depends on the signal space S but we omit the argument to ease
notation.
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For any i ∈ M , ∑sˆ∈M [∑s∈S pi (s|vi)σsˆs] = ∑s∈S pi (s|vi) = 1, so pˆi is a valid signal structure. ~ˆσ is






vi ≥∑k≥j qkpˆi (i|vk) vj
⇐⇒ ∑k≥i qk [∑s∈S pi (s|vk)σis] vi ≥∑k≥j qk [∑s∈S pi (s|vk)σis] vj
⇐⇒ ∑s∈S [∑k≥i qkpi (s|vk) vi −∑k≥j qkpi (s|vk) vj]σis ≥ 0
where the last inequality holds from (C.2). Next, if playing ~q is best response for the buyer under




j|vi) (vi − vj) = ci
⇐⇒ ∑j≤i [∑s∈S pi (s|vi)σjs] (vi − vj) = ci
which holds from (C.3). Therefore, pˆi also implements ~q. To check that the seller’s payoff is also
V under pˆi, recall from Proposition 4 that the seller’s payoff is the social welfare. Thus, it suffices
to check that the probabilities of trade breaking down at each valuation are the same across pi and
pˆi. Under pi, conditional on vi, the probability of no trade is ∑s∈S pi (s|vi)∑j≥i σjs; under pˆi, the
corresponding probability is ∑j≥i pˆi (j|vi) = ∑j≥i [∑s∈S pi (s|vi)σjs] = ∑s∈S pi (s|vi)∑j≥i σjs.
This thus establishes that it is without loss to restrict attention to direct signal structures as is
done in the main text.
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C.2.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose pi implements ~q; thus pi satisfies (3.9) and (3.10). Consider the following signal
structure {M, pˆi}:












j′|vi) , if j = i
0 , if j > i




j|vi) (vi − vj)]−ci = [∑mj≤i pi (j|vi) (vi − vj)]−















vj , for all i, j ∈M (C.4)
Fix a i ∈M . For any j < i, ∑mk≥j qkpˆi (i|vk) = ∑mk≥i qkpˆi (i|vk) since qkpˆi (i|vk) = 0 for any k < i;
so ∑mk≥i qkpˆi (i|vk) vi ≥∑mk≥j qkpˆi (i|vk) vj . Consider j > i next. Note that pˆi (i|vk) = pi (i|vk) for
any k > i, while pˆi
(











































≥ 0 from (C.4)
≥ 0
Thus ∑mk≥i qkpˆi (i|vk) vi = ∑mk≥j qkpˆi (i|vk) vj ∀j 6= i, which hence satisfies (3.9).
























)(vi − ci) ;
whereby the inequality is strict if there exists j > i such that qi > 0 but pi
(






The highest achievable seller payoff is the solution to the program that chooses pi and ~q to
maximize (3.11) subject to constraints (3.9) and (3.10). The feasible set is clearly compact and the
objective function is continuous; thus the maximum exists. Let the maximum payoff be W ∗ and
suppose it is obtained under buyer strategy ~q∗ which is implementable by pi∗. Let i¯ be the highest
investment action that is played with strictly positive probability under ~q∗. It can be verified that
if we move probability ε > 0 from qi¯∗ to q0∗, constraint (3.9) is relaxed while constraint (3.10) is
unaffected. Thus the resulting buyer strategy is still implemented by pi∗. The seller payoff achieved
under the new buyer strategy isW ∗−ε
(
vi¯ − ci¯ − v0
)
. Thus, by varying ε, any payoff in the interval[
W ∗ − qi¯
(




is achievable. To achieve a payoff lower than W ∗ − qi¯
(
vi¯ − ci¯ − v0
)
,
we begin with the buyer strategy that has shifted the entire qi¯∗ to q0∗, and induct the argument on






C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5















− ci = 0.





i|vi)+ qi+1pi (i|vi+1)] vi ≥ qi+1pi (i|vi+1) vi+1 ∀i ≤ m− 1,
⇐⇒ qi ≥ [v
i−vi−1]ci+1
[vi−vi−1−ci]vi q
i+1 ∀i ≤ m− 1.
Thus, (3.9) is satisfied under the signal structure in (3.13) if and only if q ∈ Q.
4If qi = 0, then pi
(·|vi) does not affect the equilibrium conditions (3.9) and (3.10).
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Next, denote θi = (v
i−vi−1)ci+1
(vi−vi−1−ci)vi with the convention that v
−1 = 0. So ~q ∈ Q if and only if
qi ≥ θiqi+1 ∀i ≤ m − 1. We claim that the highest seller payoff among all ~q ∈ Q is the ~q that
satisfies qi = θiqi+1 ∀i ≤ m− 1. To see this, suppose for a contradiction that qi > θiqi+1. Denote
Q = qi + qi+1, and denote qi+1 = λQ and qi = (1− λ)Q. Thus 1−λλ > θi. Consider λˆ > λ such
that 1−λˆ
λˆ




Q and increase qi+1 to qˆi+1 = λˆQ. It is readily seen
that condition (3.12) for all other j 6= i will still be satisfied after this change, so this new buyer
strategy is still in Q. Since vi+1 − vi − ci+1 > 0 ∀i ≤ m − 1, it implies that vi+1 − ci+1 > vi − ci,
thus the change increases the payoff since the probability of taking the better investment action
i+ 1 increases at the expense of the inferior action i. Therefore the highest seller payoff among all
buyer strategy in Q is achieved under the strategy such that qi = 1
θi−1 q
i−1 ∀i ≥ 1. We can write
the probability of taking each investment action i as:
qi = 1
θi−1












vj − vj−1 − cj) vj
(vj − vj−1) cj+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
αi
q0
Note that q0 = 1 − ∑mi=1 qi = 1 − ∑mi=1 αiq0; thus q0 = 11+∑m
j=1 α
j . Let α0 = 1 and we
have qi = αi∑m
j=0 α





















vi − ci)] is achievable by the signal structure in (3.13).
C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. As established in the main text, constraint (3.18) can be ignored. Since this is a linear
program, the solution must lie on a vertex. It is readily verified that q2 = 0 is never optimal under





≥ q2f (γ) (v2 − v1), if q1 = 0, then q2 = 0;
thus q1 = 0 also cannot be optimal. This implies that at least two of constraints (3.15) to (3.17)















, then constraint (3.15) subsumes
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⇐⇒ γ ≤ c1c2(v1−v0)(v2−v1+c1) , then constraint (3.16) is always subsumed by (3.15) and
(3.17), so the solution is q1 and q2 such that (3.15) and (3.17) bind. Let:
γˆ := c
1c2
(v1 − v0) (v2 − v1 + c1) .
The following follows from the previous argument and some algebra:










[1 + [c1 + v0]h (γ)]
)
1
[γ (v1 − v0) + v0]
where h (γ) = [c
2−γ(v2−v0)][v1−v0]
[γ(v1−v0)+v0][v1−v0−c1]v1 . The value is:
W (γ) = v0 +
(
v0




v1 − v0 − c1
)
+ v
2 − v0 − c2













Thus dW (γ)dγ ≤ 0 if and only if:
v0v1
(





Next, consider γ > γˆ. Suppose for a contradiction that constraint (3.16) does not bind; then
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q2γv2, so if constraint (3.15) binds, then constraint (3.16) must be violated. Contradiction.
Therefore, if γ > γˆ, then constraint (3.16) is binding under the solution of program P (γ).
There are then two cases to consider:
Case A: Constraints (3.15) and (3.16) bind. Let (q1A (γ) , q2A (γ)) be the solution to the




v1 − v0) (v2 − v1)
γv2 (c1 + v0) (v1 − v0) + v0v1 (c1 − γ (v1 − v0))
q2A (γ) =
v0v1c1
γv2 (c1 + v0) (v1 − v0) + v0v1 (c1 − γ (v1 − v0))
Under
(
q1A (γ) , q2A (γ)
)
, the value is:
WA (γ) :=v0 + q1A (γ)
(











v1 − v0) (v2 − v1)+ c1 (v2 − c2 + γ (v1 − v0))]
γv2 (v0 + c1) (v1 − v0)− v0v1 (γ (v1 − v0)− c1) ,






v1 − v0) [v0 (v2 − v1) (v2 − v1 − c2)+ c1 (v2 (v2 − c2)− v0v1)]




v1 − v0) [v0 (v2 − v1) (v2 − v1 − c2)+ c1v2 (v2 − v0 − c2)]
[v0 (c1 + γ (v0 − v1)) v1 − γ (c1 + v0) (v0 − v1) v2]2 < 0
Case B: (3.16) and (3.17) bind. Let (q1B (γ) , q2B (γ)) be the solution to the system of




v1 − v0) (c2 + γ (v2 − v0))
(v1 − v0 − c1) [v0c2 + v0v1 + γ (v1 − v0) (v2 − v0)]
q2B (γ) =
v0v1




q1B (γ) , q2B (γ)
)
, the value is:
WB (γ) :=v0 + q1B (γ)
(








c2v0 + v0v1 + γ (v1 − v0) (v2 − v0) ;
It is immediate that WB (γ) is strictly decreasing.


















, where the last inequality follows from γ > γˆ. The last inequality would imply constraint
(3.17).
























q2γv2 which means that constraint (3.15) is satisfied.
Therefore, for any γ > γˆ, both WA (γ) and WB (γ) are attainable. The following result then
follows:
Lemma 5. When γ > γˆ, the value function of program P (γ) is W (γ) = max {WA (γ) ,WB (γ)}.
Since both WA and WB are strictly decreasing, W is also strictly decreasing.
The proposition then follows from Lemma 4 and 5.
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